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The thesis presents a lexico-semantic analysis of the English preposition in 
within the framework of Cognitive Grammar. Fifty-six uses of in are analysed, 
comprising spatial as well as abstract senses. The preposition is regarded as a 
unified concept whose meaning is manifested via a radial category of senses, 
involving various levels of abstraction. The category is organised according to the 
principles of mental imagery, metonymic and metaphorical processes. The role of 
image schemas in underlying the conceptual stmcture of the preposition in is 
experimentally demonstrated. The results indicate that the 56 uses of in are 
structured by the image schemas for CONTAINER, PART-WHOLE and PATH. 
The semantic analysis of the three senses comprises configurational as well as 
relational parameters of atemporal relations. The preposition in is defined on the 
basis of the three image-schematic gestalts.
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1. C H A P T E R  O N E
Introduction
1.1 Orientation
The aim of this Introduction is to present what lies behind the author’s 
motivation in choosing spatial relations as a subject of investigation within the 
Cognitive Paradigm.
The discussion of motivation can be divided into two stages:
- first, the exploration of the importance of spatiality for language and cognition 
(Section 1.2);
- second, a demonstration of how prepositions are of relevance to the framework 
adopted (Section 1.3).
1.2 Spatiality in language and cognition
One general motivation lies with the apparent primacy of space in language 
and cognition: given the privileged place that space occupies in language and in 
man’s cognitive system, it seems perfectly justified to investigate this part of the 
lexicon. It is a truism that space always surrounds us, that we are always part of it; 
indeed, all objects, states, events and human actions should be seen against the 
backdrop of space. Therefore, in a trivial way, language and cognition, on the one 
hand, and space, on the other hand, are interconnected in that language/cognition 
are anchored into space; each speech event or cognitive process takes place in 
space (and time). Less trivially, however, this bond is manifested in the privileged 
place that space occupies in language and in man’s cognitive system.
The variety of uses that are made of spatial words in nonspatial contexts offers 
just one example of the extent to which space pervades language. The recognition 
of this primacy of space for natural language actually led a number of linguists to 
posit that spatial expressions are more basic, grammatically and semantically, than 
various kinds of nonspatial expressions. This claim is commonly referred to as the 
localist hypothesis (Lyons 1977: 718-724). According to this view, not only 
should the temporal and metaphorical meanings of a number of words be 
understood in terms of/be derived from their spatial meaning, but also what is
11
usually thought of as being metaphorical can be brought within the scope of 
localism. As such, verbs denoting a change of state can be analysed as verbs of 
motion, and even grammatical categories such as tense, aspect, possessive and 
existential constructions can, at least partly, be proven to have a locative origin. 
While the full-fledged version of localism seems rather controversial, it is an 
incontrovertible fact that, semantically, the spatial use of a number of lexical items 
is the basic one in that an understanding of their meaning in nonspatial contexts is 
based precisely on this spatial meaning.
This “weaker version of localism” is also advocated in more recent, cognitive 
approaches to lexical semantics, where, roughly speaking, the meaning of a word is 
the conceptual content that this word addresses, which, in turn, is the result of our 
mind processing, ordering, and interacting with reality.1 Lakoff and Johnson point 
out that
“[...] the prime candidates for concepts that are understood directly (i.e. without 
metaphor) are the simple spatial concepts such as UP” (1980: 56)
and that
“[...] we typically conceptualise the non-physical in terms of the physical (e.g. the 
spatial).”2 (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 59)
Langacker (1987) can be cited in the same vein, when he points out that a 
number of spatial terms have been extended from the spatial domain to others, 
including the abstract domains.3
Even for conceptualisations outside the scope of actual lexicalization, the 
primacy of space can often be demonstrated in a straightforward way:
- the system of locative inclusion seems psychologically basic to part-whole and 
class inclusion hierarchies (Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976:220);
- people are often inclined to visualise or spatialise their thought. Think of the use 
of pictorial representations instead of propositional descriptions in representing
1 Since Cognitive Semantics is the framework of this thesis, I will not go into detail here, but I 
refer the reader to Section 2.3.
2 Similarly, Lakoff (1990:73) claims that many abstract concepts, even such basic concepts as 
time, quantity, state, change, action, cause, purpose, means, and modality, arise from 
metaphorical mappings of spatial concepts.
3 Langacker (1987) cautions us that although concepts in nonspatial contexts may be understood 
in spatial terms, and in that sense be more basic, this does not mean that the domain of spatial 
experience is more basic than other domains (domains of colour or temperature). For instance, 
although in in thej ewels in the box grounds the temporal metaphor in two weeks, this does not
necessarily moan that cmc domain of experience is more basic than any of the others.
conceptual knowledge. Moreover, much of our reasoning seems to rely on visual 
thinking (Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976: 77);
- irrespective of whether they have a label in the lexicon or not, the 
representation of a number of object concepts includes such spatial concepts as 
size, place and movement (Cuyckens 1991: 13).
If we agree that space occupies such a privileged place both in language and in 
man’s organisation of conceptual knowledge, it seems justified to investigate how 
spatial information is actually reflected in them; in other words, how precisely 
space is conceptualised and how it is lexicalised (what the language of space 
consists of).
An inquiry into the language of space may include the following topics:
- the morphological specification of spatial attributes of objects. In this respect, 
Indo-European languages may be among a minority in not having obligatory 
spatial morphemes, i.e. in not treating spatial features on a par with tense, gender, 
person, and number (Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976);
- the lexical resources for referring to space. These may include:
• the elaborate system of place names for geographical and political areas;
• lexical items for dealing with space in which people live and work. Among 
them are containers (rooms, prisons, boats), pathways (aisles, streets, tunnels), 
and boundaries (beaches, borders, blockades);
• labels for points of the compass, for units of length, area, volume, for such 
properties as height, length and width;
• lexical items that express spatial relations (prepositions, but also verbs like 
reach, cross) (Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976: 376-379).
For obvious reasons, it is not possible in this present work to make a thorough 
exploration of the way space is represented in language and thought. I will restrict 
myself to an investigation of the lexical resources used to refer to space. More 
specifically, in this thesis, I will confine myself to analysing the semantics of the 
English preposition in.
Investigating the semantics of the language of space means that I am going to 
transgress into the conceptualisation of space on the cognitive view, where the 
semantic structure and the structure of our conceptual knowledge are not taken to 
be different in kind. Semantic structures are conceptualisations shaped for symbolic 
purposes, in other words, they are conceptualisations that are labelled by a symbol 
(i.e. a lexical item).
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In sum, within the context of this thesis, the distinction between things lexical 
and things conceptual is artificial. This study should be regarded as an inquiry into 
lexicalised conceptualisations of space.
1.3 Prepositions in the Cognitive Paradigm
There exists a strong relation between the emergence of the Cognitive 
Paradigm and the revived interest in prepositions. The centrality of prepositions 
within the framework of Cognitive Grammar relies on the fact that prepositions, 
as spatial expressions, are highly representative of the nature of linguistic meaning 
(conceptualisation in this paradigm comprises linguistic meaning, in other words, 
linguistic interpretation equates with conceptualisation).
The overall assumption underlying the study of prepositional meaning is that 
all semantic extension, at some time, has originated from spatial senses.
Therefore, the study of our conceptual means to structure concrete space supplies 
us with clues for our mental organisation of semantic space in general (Talmy 
1983: 226). Consequently, special attention should, first of all, be paid to the 
analysis of the spatial senses of prepositions in order to provide ourselves with a 
firm structural basis for semantic extensions. In doing so, I do not purport to draw 
a dichotomous distinction between concrete and abstract senses of the lexical 
item. Spatial senses are viewed as the anchoring point for conceptualisation. They 
constitute the impetus of the category and are responsible for establishing the 
prototype (Vandeloise 1991).
The essential point is that all conceptualisation, that is, all mental experience, 
is ultimately based on physical experience gained from our physical functioning in 
a spatial environment. Lakoff (1987: 267) calls it preconceptual experience. 
Conceptualisations are ultimately grounded in and structured by nonpropositional, 
preconceptual bodily experience (Johnson 1987). This experience is mentally 
coded in image schemas, which function as cognitive models for all higher-order 
mental constructions, that is, they give meaning even to those utterances which 
deal with the most abstract and complex situations. Consequently,
"[...] every thought is ultimately linked to the structure of spatial concepts which 
grow out of our preconceptual structure of experience."
(Zelinsky-Wibbelt 1993: 5)
All abstract concepts are metaphorizations or metonymies of semantically 
concrete, spatial predications. In other words, abstract expressions are indirectly
understood in terms of directly meaningful, preconceptual models which 
constrained by the perception of physical relations.
1.4 Summary of Chapter One
Given such a theoretical orientation (Sections 1.2-1.3), it is inevitable that 
attention should be focused on those lexical items the function of which is to 
symbolise conceptualisations of spatial relations, and which, through semantic 
extension, are employed in the construal of relations in more abstract domains.
In the following chapters, I will try to demonstrate that spatial prepositions are 
representative of the Cognitive Paradigm. Lexico-semantic analyses of spatial 
prepositions provide information on the nature of linguistic meaning and 
convincingly illustrate the cognitive stand on the crucial notions of polysemy, 
categorisation, sense motivation and extension. By the same token, analysing the 
internal structure of prepositional categories provides some insight into the 
semantic structure of the lexicon and language processing in general.
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2. C H A P T E R  T W O
Theoretical prerequisites
2.1 Orientation
The aim of Chapter Two is threefold. In Section 2.2, two schools of thought, 
objectivism and subjectivism, will be presented and their respective 
interpretations of the relation between man and the physical world (space) will be 
discussed. In Section 2.3, correspondences will be revealed between 
philosophical and linguistic thought. Emphasis will be laid upon recent 
developments in linguistic theory that point to the primacy of the cognitively 
natural description of meaning and hence advocate the notion of relativistic and 
subjective space. Consequently, four assumptions of the Cognitive Paradigm, 
relevant to the current analysis, are to be discussed. These are:
1. the holistic nature of the Cognitive Paradigm;
2. the relation between language and reality;
3. mental imagery;
4. meaning and categorisation.
In Section 2.4, the subject of the current study will be defined within the 
framework of Cognitive Linguistics. Some solutions to the question of 
prepositional polysemy will be provided. The summary of Chapter Two is 
presented in Section 2.5.
2.2 The philosophical background
2.2.1 Introduction
An outline of four philosophical approaches to the notion of spatiality will 
now be presented. In Section 2.2.2, the theory of absolute space will be discussed. 
In Section 2.2.3, I will present the theory of relative space. Merleau Ponty’s 
“Phenomenology of Perception” is discussed in Section 2.2.4.
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2.2.2 The theory of absolute space
The notion of absolute space derives from Isaac Newton (Tatarkiewicz 1993). 
His approach has been reinforced by the theory referred to as substantivalism, 
which argues for the reality of the spatial substance. There are four basic aspects 
pertaining to the notion of absolute space: its independence, unity, immutability 
and primacy.
2.2.3 The theory of relative space
Antisubstantivalism, or the theory of relative space, is the approach to be 
quoted in order to challenge the postulates of the theory of absolute space. The 
main claim here is that there is no such substance as space. Antisubstantivalism 
does not maintain that there are no spatial properties and relations, or that things 
do not possess spatial features. It is only the reality of any entities that have no 
intrinsic features except spatial ones that is rejected. The theory of relative space 
describes space as being dependent upon matter for its existence. Space exists 
only because matter does. Moreover, space is viewed as fragmentary rather than 
unitary. The core idea is that every material object has associated with it its own 
private and dependent space, which it carries around with itself, and which 
interpenetrates with the spaces of other objects.
Gottfried Leibniz is among the most radical supporters of relativism 
(Tatarkiewicz 1993). His claim can be reduced to the assertion that neither time 
nor space can have a separate existence. In other words, space is to be viewed as 
merely the separation between objects having no existence in its own right.
Another version of relativism is that favoured by Emmanuel Kant 
(Tatarkiewicz 1993). He claims that spatial features are subjective phenomena; 
they are the projection by the mind onto the physical world, rather than something 
that exists there independently of us, and is newly discovered by us. Spatiality is 
dependent upon the mind; it is not absolute, but relative.
Bertrand Russell draws our attention to the role of the senses in perception by 
distinguishing between reality and the appearance of the objects of our perception. 
He also denies the existence of absolute space by advocating a plethora of sensual 
spaces. Special emphasis should be laid on the "deceptive" role of vision, which, 
according to Russell, is responsible for the plethora of perspectives an object can 
acquire (Tatarkiewicz 1993). At the same time, he claims that it is scarcely so in 
the case of touch, smell, taste, or sound. In other words, there arises an interesting
claim that vision is the most pervasive as well as the most deceptive sense 
responsible for our perception of space.
Albert Einstein’s Theory of Relativity provides an extreme version of the 
subjectivist theories of space. The Theory postulates that space is not absolute, but 
determined by objects. Consequently, time, movement, forces, as well as spatially 
extended entities are viewed as relative (Tatarkiewicz 1993).
2.2.4 The theory of phenomenological space
The third theory concerning the nature of space is based on Maurice Merleau 
Ponty’s "Phenomenology of Perception" (Maciejczak 1995). Ponty postulates a 
relationship between space (or the outside world) and man, which can be 
summarised in the following way: the world is inseparable from the subject, who 
is nothing else but its projection; the subject, on the other hand, is inseparable 
from the world, which projects itself.
A more detailed discussion of this theory reveals the following:
- the body is the subject of perception, as well as the source of orientation in 
space; in other words, the intentional body locates us in the world;
- the world is a horizon in which the world and existence constantly confirm 
each other;4
- the structure of the field of immediate perception is a dynamic structure of 
interrelated entities;
- each object has its oriented space, its here and possible there. The orientation 
of space is determined by the phenomenological body as a system of potential 
activity;
- the body is a system of possible actions whose position is determined by the 
tasks imposed by a concrete situation;
- there exists communication between the body and the environment. The data 
are shaped in such a way as to enable a clear perception and field of manoeuvre. 
Whatever is of no importance for a given aim - an actual location of the body - is 
neglected. Thus, to have a body means to have a certain way of knowing space, 
whose source is the process of anchoring the subject in the world (Maciejczak 
1995: 34-47).
4 The notion o f horizon is discussed in Section 4.4.2.4.
2.2.5 Conclusions
The three approaches presented in Sections 2.2.2-2.2.4 above form a 
continuum varying according to the degree to which the subjective element is 
present in the perception of space. The theory of absolute space appears to be the 
most “dehumanised” of all the hypotheses evoked. Relativistic theories of space 
underline the subjective element in the interpretation of spatiality. They stress the 
importance of the human factor in interpreting the outside world, paying special 
attention to the role of sensual input, perspective and personal experience. The 
phenomenological interpretation of perception results in viewing space as a 
dynamic relationship between the body and the outside world.
In Section 2.3, I will try to demonstrate that the traditions of objectivism, 
subj ectivism, and phenomenology have been synthesised in the Cognitive Paradigm 
into the “myth of experientialism” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Johnson 1987).
2.3 The Cognitive Paradigm
2.3.1 Introduction
In Section 2.3.2, the influence of the philosophical tradition of objectivism and 
subjectivism upon schools of linguistics will be discussed. In Sections 2.3.3-2.3.6, 
the four basic assumptions of the Cognitive Paradigm will be presented.
2.3.2 Language and philosophy
" Time and space provide the basic co-ordinate system within which all 
experience can be located, and much of the machinery of language is devoted to 
making such localizations communicable.” (Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976:28)
I will now try to determine which mode of understanding reality should be 
adopted in order to be able to analyse human spatial language.
The two main assumptions concerning the notion of spatiality emerging from 
the philosophical outline presented in Section 2.2, obj ectivism and subj ectivism 
(relativism), have had correspondences in linguistic approaches to the relation 
between language and the world.
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The schools of linguistics based on the prerequisites of objectivism resulted in 
defining linguistic meaning with the tools of formal logic and mathematics.5 
Formal semantics, the term used to refer to all schools of semantics other than the 
functional approach of Cognitive Linguistics, views language as an autonomous 
module, independent of other mental processes (Saeed 1997: 299). By the same 
token, language components are to be analysed in separation from each other. 
Meaning is understood in terms of conditions based on reference and truth; truth 
consists in the correspondence between symbols and states of affairs in the world. 
The association between symbols and things in the world can be described in an 
objectively correct way. Meaning represented in terms of a logical metalanguage 
is autonomous, conceptually simple, abstract and mathematically well-formed. It 
is consequently reduced and unnatural in not comprising the richness of detail 
contributed by the broadly understood context.
Recent developments in Cognitive Psychology on the structure of natural 
categories brought about the demise of objectivism in many areas of linguistics 
(Rosch 1973, 1978). The realisation of the relative and subjective nature of 
meaning resulted in the reappreciation of spatial cognition and the establishing of 
a new paradigm.
“ There is nothing to be gained from trying to say how it is that sentences map 
onto the world. If, as the history of logical empiricism shows, we cannot give a 
one-to-one mapping of cognitively meaningful sentences onto states of affairs 
existing objectively in the world as it is in itself, than we ought to quit pursuing 
theories of objective truth and reference. What we can do is to apply what we are 
learning about category structure, basic level conceptualisation, image-schematic 
patterns, and the role of imaginative structures and projections in all our 
understandings.” (Johnson 1991: 18)
What follows is a brief summary of the four aspects of Cognitive Linguistics 
that are relevant to the current investigation.
2.3.3. The holistic nature of the Cognitive Paradigm
The guiding assumption of Cognitive Grammar is the holistic and continuous 
nature of all human behaviour and its underlying structure. Considered a more 
specific faculty intertwined with all mental processes, natural language is claimed 
to be a part of the overall cognitive capacity of human beings. Linguistic structure
5 For a detailed presentation see Lakoff (1987), Saeed (1997).
should thus be studied as a reflection of cognitive processing in general and hence 
a source of information about cognitive abilities.
" Fundamental cognitive abilities and experientially derived cognitive models have 
direct and pervasive linguistic manifestations, and, conversely, language structure 
furnishes important clues concerning basic mental phenomena.”
(Langacker 1993:1)
Cognitive Linguistics rej ects the principle of economy characteristic of formal 
schools. There is no dichotomy between linguistic and extralinguistic knowledge. 
Consequently, it is impossible to delimit the meaning of a lexical item precisely, as 
linguistic knowledge is a part of knowledge in general.
“ The distinction between semantics and pragmatics (or between linguistic and 
extralinguistic knowledge) is largely artificial, and the only viable conception of 
linguistic semantics is one that avoids such false dichotomies and is consequently 
encyclopaedic in nature.” (Langacker 1987 :63)
The traditional dichotomy of a grammar and a lexicon is discarded as a case of 
exclusionary fallacy. Instead,
“[...] lexicon, morphology, and syntax form a continuum of meaningful structures 
whose segregation into discrete components is necessarily artificial.”
(Langacker 1991: 3)
The speaker’s linguistic system is an inventory of conventional units structured 
according to general cognitive abilities, such as abstraction and categorisation 
(Section 2.3.6).
The holistic character of Cognitive Semantics is best conveyed by image 
schemas (Johnson 1987). Their nonpropositional, dynamic and basically embodied 
nature lies at the foundation of human thinking, understanding and reasoning. 
Image schemas arise from the preconceptual level to permeate our imagery and 
thus function as a viable tool for explaining human conceptual processes reflected 
in linguistic meaning (Section 3 .2).
2.3.4 Language and reality
In this section, I once again turn to the notions of subjective and objective 
reality, and attempt to determine their participation in representing spatial 
expressions. To this end, I will employ the notion of experientialism.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) describe experientialism as
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"[...] capable of satisfying the real and reasonable concerns that have motivated 
the myths of both subj ectivism and objectivism but without either the objectivist 
obsession with absolute truth or the subjectivist insistence that imagination is 
totally unrestricted." (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:228)
According to the “myth of experientialism”, reality is not what language 
describes. Linguistic means are not in absolute correspondence to the outside 
world. Language expresses how speakers have mentally implemented the common 
experience of the specific environment they live in. Linguistic expressions cannot 
and do not stand in simple and direct relation to states of affairs in real or possible 
words; rather, linguistic expressions invoke a speaker’s construal, 
conceptualisation, or mental representation of states of affairs (Lakoff 1987). 
Consequently, the semantic distinctions suggested by our linguistic utterances do 
not agree with the real physical extension of the configurated parts, but with the 
conceptual schematization.
The above considerations point to correspondences between subjectivist 
(relational) theories of space in philosophy (Section 2.2.3) and the Cognitive 
Paradigm in linguistics. Lakoff (1987) endorses the ideas expressed by Kant in 
underscoring the mentalistic character of linguistically conveyed reality.
"[...] emphasis on interaction and interactional properties shows how meaning is 
always meaning to a person. And this emphasis on the construction of coherence 
via experiential gestalts provides an account of how understanding uses the 
primary resources of the imagination via 
metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:228)
Johnson (1987) continues the phenomenological tradition of Marleau Ponty in 
putting forward a claim for the nonpropositional character of meaning structured 
by bodily patterns called image schemas (Section 2.2.4).
Having admitted that linguistic reality is subjective and relativistic in being 
human-determined, I nevertheless claim that absolute, Newtonian space is utilised 
by people (Herskovits 1986). People make use of the interpretation of the world in 
obj ective terms to the extent that it serves as the ultimate point of reference, the 
anchoring system for human encoding and decoding processes. In other words, I 
do not deny the existence of objective reality. However, I reject the claim of one- 
to-one correspondence between language and reality. In taking a middle approach, 
I claim that linguistic structures refer to our concept of reality. Our awareness of 
the “ideal world” serves linguistic purposes to the extent that it
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provides the speaker with the point of reference, which becomes modified during 
language production.
“[...] lexical concepts are mental entities that mediate between words and their 
extralinguistic referents.” (Cuyckens 1991: 11)
In other words, a “common-sense” view of the physical world underlies our 
perception and every linguistic realisation of its physical aspect. In this view, 
space is three-dimensional, isotropic and Euclidean. The ground extends to 
infinity, with air above and rocks below the surface. The ground supports solid 
objects, which are discrete wholes with a well-defined surface, a shape and a 
location in space. Relations between objects are determined by gravity (Herskovits 
1986: 27).
The canonical description presented above may be fundamental, but it does not 
correspond to the reality conveyed via language since what people say refers to 
appearances and conceptualisations.6 The only justification, then, for having a 
fundamentally objective view of the world is its role as the background for 
appearances and conceptualisations.
Having determined the background role of objective reality and the decisive 
function of conceptualisation in the linguistic description of spatial relations, I 
now turn to the nature of those conceptual processes.
2.3.5 Mental imagery
The assumption here is that the semantic distinctions conforming to our 
linguistic utterances do not correspond to the real physical extensions of entities 
people refer to, but to their conceptual schematizations. It is our conception of 
reality, not the real world per se, that is relevant to linguistic semantics (Langacker 
1987:19). One of the techniques of this approach draws on abstracting from the 
vast amount of highly complex and variegated information available to us, and 
focusing on those aspects which, according to conventional experience, figure as 
salient, essential in a particular type of situation, as well as from the speaker's 
perspective. Schematization of this kind is the fundamental principle underlying 
the linguistic expression of spatial configurations (Talmy 1983: 225); it involves 
the selection of those spatial properties of a scene which, in a given domain and 
situation, are essential to how we view it as a whole, while the remaining
6 The concept of reality advocated by Cognitive Linguistics is illustrated by L akoff s (1987) notion 
oflC M s.
properties, being non-essential, do not participate in this process. This selection 
process relies predominantly on geometrical and topological properties (Section
4.2.3.1). However, as I noted in Section 2.3.4, Euclidean geometry does not 
always hold for linguistically conveyed spatial relations. It can only serve as an 
ideal against which the processes of encoding and decoding are set. Consequently, 
conditions of the use of spatial expressions cannot be reliably extrapolated from 
the objective, geometrical properties of extralinguistic situations. Instead, we have 
to look for cognitive principles that make it possible to conceptualise certain 
extralinguistic situations in alternate ways.
The term imagery refers to the fact that people can conceive of a situation 
according to different images, which results in different expressions to describe 
the same situation.
“ Our capacity to construe the same content in alternate ways is referred to as 
imagery; expressions describing the same conceived situation may nonetheless 
be semantically quite distinct by virtue of contrasting images they impose on it.” 
( Langacker 1991: 4)
Several dimensions of imagery can be discerned:
1. The level of specificity
For example, She was inside the room is more specific than She was in the room, 
because inside tends to imply total inclusion within the boundaries of the 
landmark.
2. Scope, i.e. the array of content implied
For instance, The door opened easily necessarily implies an agent, whereas The 
door opened does not.
3. Background assumptions and expectations, i.e. connotations
This dimension pertains to connotations (consider “stingy” vs. “thrifty”). In the 
context of social hierarchy, for example, beneath has a more negative connotation 
than below.
4. Perspective, relating to various aspects:
a) Viewpoint, which includes vantage point (deixis) and orientation. Orientation 
pertains to the alignment with respect to the axes of the visual field (or a 
comparable coordinate system for other domains). Imposing a particular 
orientation on physical space allows us to locate entities relative to certain axes 
(Section 4.2.3.1.3.2). Vantage point is the position from which the scene is 
viewed. The choice of vantage point imposes on the scene an alignment of
foreground and background. In other words, vantage point relates to deixis and 
may involve cases of deictic shift (Section 4.2.3.2.1).
“ In construing a situation for linguistic purposes, the speaker is able to 
conceptualise how it would appear from different vantage points and to portray it 
accordingly, irrespective of his actual vantage point.” (Langacker 1987: 48)
b) Subjective versus objective construal.
An entity is construed subjectively when the conceptualiser himself is absorbed in 
the process of conception. It is construed objectively if it is fully distinct from the 
conceptualiser. Subjectivity is a matter of degree and objectively construed 
entities may receive a more subjective construal. This semantic shift is called 
subiectification.
Two types of subjectification are of special interest to us:
“ The first type of subjectification is exemplified by the contrast between two 
senses of across:
(a) Harvey crawled across the table.
(b) A famous movie star is sitting across the table.
[-.]
In (b) it is the conceptualiser who traces along the path to compute the trajector’s 
fixed location, but he does so only mentally. [...] objective physical motion by 
the trajector is converted under subjectification to abstract subjective motion by 
the conceptualiser.
[...]
The next example exemplifies a second type of subjectification.
(a) The balloon rose slowly.
(b) The hill gently rises from the bank of the river.
In (b) it is the conceptualiser who moves subjectively through the scene, 
mentally tracing an upward path along the hill’s expanse, thus imposing a notion 
of directionality on the static situation.”
(Langacker 1991: 217-18)
The first type of subjectification will appear in the case study in Chapter Four.
5. Designation and trajector-landmark organisation make up the fifth dimension 
of imagery, which offers the basic tools for the semantic analysis in this study, and 
will thus be discussed in Section 4.2.2.
2.3.6 Meaning and categorisation
Set within the “myth of experiential ism”, Cognitive Grammar departs from the 
view that the structure of reality as reflected in language is the product of the 
human mind (Saeed 1997: 301). Meaning is based on the conceptual framework 
of the speaker, and truth and falsity are relative to the way an observer construes a
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situation. Cognitive, biological and pragmatic principles are employed to explain 
how the speaker attributes a certain salience, relevance and typicality to the 
participants in a given scene, and how, in accordance with this attribution, the 
objects participate in certain relations to fit (at least to some extent) the structure 
of mental categories. Those mental categories emerge from experience and are 
reflected in cognitive domains. In other words, defining meaning is tantamount 
to stating how linguistic expressions are determined by conceptualisation, and 
how conceptualisation is constrained by the speaker's environment, his 
perspective and his purposes (Section 2.3.4).
2.3.6.1 Semantic categories
The semantic meaning of a lexical item may be represented as a network. The 
use of a lexical item is considered as a point of access to a network, where 
typically one of its modes will be activated. Other modes in the network will also 
be activated, with different degrees of salience. Chances of activation depend on 
the context and on the relative proximity (association) within the network. This 
accounts for the intuition that some concepts are more inherently associated with a 
particular word than others. “The semantic core” of a lexical item is defined in 
terms of centrality and likelihood of activation in the network.
“ The multitude of specifications that figure in our encyclopaedic conception of 
an entity clearly form a gradation in terms of their centrality to our understanding 
of the notion.” (Langacker 1987: 66)
If linguistic knowledge is an integrated part of knowledge in general, then the 
meaning of a lexical item cannot be precisely delimited (Section 2.3.3). Instead, a 
concept can be represented as a category of senses.
Cognitive Semantics views categorisation as a continuous and gradual process. 
The traditional, Aristotelian approach to category membership in terms of yes/no 
dichotomous judgements has been proved inadequate for a natural description of 
both natural and linguistic categories. The cognitive alternative is a reliable 
representation of a category structure that should provide both an exhaustive 
description of all senses of a lexical item as well as natural generalisations over 
different senses (Langacker 1987, 1988; Taylor 1989). In other words, 
categorisation should be devoid of rampant polysemy, of a kind that would 
include contextual variations among senses of a lexical item. As indicated by 
Geeraerts (1988), the two approaches, focus on highly differentiated general
meanings and focus on maximally general meanings, are complementary rather 
than in conflict. Langackefs network model of category structure explicitly 
incorporates both aspects. Thus, Langacker envisages two kinds of relations 
between the senses of a linguistic form, viz. relations of instantiation, or 
elaboration (the one meaning elaborates, with greater specificity, a more abstract, 
schematic meaning), and relations of extension (certain specifications of the one 
meaning are suspended or modified in the extended meaning) (Section 4.3.3).
Consider profiles for run in John ran and Fido ran. The same predicate, run, 
designates two series of different configurations, one appropriate to a two-legged 
creature, and one appropriate to a four-legged one. These are distinct activities at a 
level of fine detail, yet at a level of grosser detail (ignoring the number of legs), 
they are perceived as similar. At an even more abstract level, these two processes 
are related to the process profiled by run in The water is running.
In a grammar of English, we need to represent the extent of conventional usage 
of run and run. The model of representation must reflect the extent to which those 
profiles comprise a unified concept respectively. To meet those requirements, the 
semantic representations of lexical items must have a complex structure, involving 
a network of both the particulars of usage, as well as the generalisations made 
about them at various levels of abstraction.
Recognition of a single, general meaning does not remove the need to identify 
more specific meanings (Taylor 1989). The specific meanings, though, tend to be 
arranged as a radial or family resemblance structure, which may feature a central 
sense (or senses) together with an array of elaborations, of and extensions from this 
modified version of a prototype.
2.3.6.2 Prototype
A prototype is the best example of the category. It displays the highest number 
of features by which category members are defined. It is first learned by children 
and most easily recalled by adults (Rosch 1978).
“ Presumably, it is the meaning that is acquired first, and also most likely to be 
activated in a neutral context.” (Langacker 1988: 135)
In other words, a prototype is the “anchoring example”around which other 
members of the category are arranged.
“ Could it not be the case that we choose that meaning as prototypical that gives 
the best starting point for interpreting the various applications in which we 
encounter that item? [...] In that case, the prototype is that meaning that best 
enables us to make sense (literally, as an interpretative process) of the various 
ways in which words are used. Or, in other words, the prototype would have to 
be thought of as an interpretative perspective that helps us to interpret the uses of 
a word.” (Geeraerts 1992: 261-262)
Lindner (1982) assumes that we must list in the grammar all meanings a lexical 
item has, including the relations between them, where some are extended from 
others. Certain of the listed meanings will be more cognitively prominent: they 
will have a natural salience other meanings will not have. We might call these 
prototypical meanings; they are the meanings thought of first. The most salient 
meanings are often defined in the concrete domain (Section 4.3.2). They may be 
historically prior ones, as they are likely to be the most established (or entrenched) 
meanings, which are shared by the greatest number of speakers. However, in time, 
subsequent meanings may become just as established and salient 
(Section 4.3).
To sum up,
“ In forming a category people have the ability to make extensions (metaphorical 
and other) from a prototype. I further posit a capacity for abstraction - or 
schematization - to represent the commonality inherent in multiple experiences. 
[...] A complex category can be represented in terms of either Lakoff’s radial 
category or my own network model (the two being basically equivalent).[...] 
Schemas and prototypes are both essential to category structure, reflecting 
different aspects of a unified phenomenon.” (Langacker 1993: 2)
In the formation of a complex category, consequently, outward growth from 
the prototype tends to co-occur with upward growth (i.e. the emergence of more 
schematic notions).
Although extensions from the central sense cannot be predicted they can, 
nevertheless, be motivated.
“ The most radical prototype phenomena are radial categories. [...] The 
noncentral models are not predictable from the central model, but they are 
motivated by the central models and other models that characterise the links to 
the centre.” (Lakoff 1987: 153-154)
“ A theory of motivation is required, since the noncentral subcategories are 
neither arbitrary nor predictable from the central subcategory.”
(Lakoff 1987: 379)
Prepositions as radial categories will be discussed in Section 4.3.3.
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2.3.6.3 Metonymy and metaphor
Metonymy and metaphor are basic cognitive processes responsible for the 
elaboration and extension of senses within a category (concept).
2.3.6.3.1 Metonymy
Metonymy occurs when an expression that normally designates one entity is 
used instead to designate another, associated entity. The mapping occurs within 
one domain. The part may stand for the whole (I need some wheels). 
Alternatively, the whole may stand for the part (My pencil broke). The latter type 
of metonymy overlaps with the notion of active zones (Section 4.2.3):
“ Metonymy largely overlaps with what I have called the active-zone 
phenomenon. An entity’s active zone, with respect to a particular relationship, 
comprises those portions of the entity that participate most directly and crucially 
in that relationship.”(Langacker 1993:31)
Consider the following example: He is in the bedroom. Obviously, only part of 
the landmark elaboration is referred to (the interior of the room). The boundaries 
do not participate in the relation described by in.
Other examples of metonymic relations include:
- a place for an institution e.g. The White House gave no comment;
- a producer for the product e.g. Have you read the latest Vonnegut yet?
- an object for the person using it e.g. All officials under the crown’,
Despite the variety, metonymic relations are reflections of the same cognitive 
ability:
“ Metonymy is basically a reference-point phenomenon. More precisely, the 
entity that is normally designated by a metonymic expression serves as a 
reference point affording mental access to the desired target (i.e. the entity 
actually being referred to).[...] By virtue of our reference point ability, a well- 
chosen metonymic expression lets us mention one entity that is salient and easily 
coded, and thereby evoke - essentially automatically - a target that is either of 
lesser interest or harder to name.” (Langacker 1993: 30)
Lakoff (1987) stretches the notion of metonymy to category structure. Quite 
often, a part of a category is used to comprehend a category as a whole:
“A major source of such [prototype] effects is metonymy - a situation in which 
some subcategory or member or submodel is used (often for some limited and 
intermediate purpose) to comprehend the category as a whole - in reasoning, 
cognition, etc.
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Within the theory of cognitive models, such cases are represented by metonymic 
models.” (Lakoff 1987: 79)
Of crucial interest to me among metonymic models are so-called “typical 
examples”.
“ Typical examples include cases like the following:
Robins and sparrows are typical birds.
Apples and oranges are typical fruits.” (Lakoff 1987: 86)
During the analysis of the preposition in, I will try to demonstrate, for instance, 
that a jar (a three-dimensional, porous, bounded, cylinder container) serves as a 
typical example of containers in general (Section 4.3.6.2.3). Abstract containing 
landmarks preserve the topology of the source domain (Have you ever been in 
love?; He spoke in Russian.) (Turner 1993).
2.3.6.3.2 Metaphor
Metaphor is a cognitive process of mapping across domains. Metaphor maps 
the structure of a source (or donor) domain onto a corresponding structure in a 
target (or recipient) domain. As such, metaphor is a basic cognitive ability that 
allows us to conceive and think of abstract concepts.
“ Abstract reason is a matter of two things: 
reason based on bodily experience, and
metaphorical projections from concrete to abstract domains.” (Lakoff 1987: 275)
If abstract experience and reasoning is basically metaphorical, then it goes 
beyond the objectivist mirror of external reality. The “imaginative” nature of 
human thought calls for an experientialist view of reason (Section 2.3.4).
“ In domains where there is no clearly discernible preconceptual structure to our 
experience, we import such structure via metaphor. Metaphor provides us with a 
means for comprehending domains of experience that do not have a 
preconceptual structure of their own. A great many of our domains of experience 
are like this. Comprehending experience via metaphor is one of the great 
imaginative triumphs of the human mind. Much of rational thought involves the 
use of metaphoric models. Any adequate account of rationality must account for 
the use of imagination and much of imagination consists of metaphorical 
reasoning. Such an account is outside the realm of objectivist theories."
(Lakoff 1987: 303)
Since certain metaphors are so deeply entrenched in everyday human thought, 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) call these “metaphors we live by”. They distinguish 
roughly three kinds of metaphors:
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1. Ontological metaphors allow us to conceive of abstract concepts as concrete 
entities. Personification is a special type of ontological metaphor.
2. Structural metaphors map a particular structure of a source domain onto a 
more abstract target domain. For instance, an argument is often conceived in 
terms of war; life is often conceived as a journey; the body is understood as a 
container for emotions.
3. Orientational metaphors map the dimensions and configurations of oriented 
physical space onto more abstract domains. For instance, social hierarchies are 
often conceived in terms of HIGH STATUS IS UP; LOW STATUS IS DOWN.
Those metaphors are grounded in our everyday physical experience and they 
show different degrees of abstraction. For example: AN ACTIVITY IS A PATH is 
more general than LINGUISTIC ACTION IS A PATH (Section 4.3.5.2). 
Nevertheless, certain metaphors are associated (as the example suggests). In fact, 
those associations can be accounted for by reference to Langacker’s model of 
schematization, where the commonality inherent in several metaphors (e.g. 
LINGUISTIC ACTION IS A PATH; THOUGHT IS A PATH) may result in a 
unifying and more schematic (abstract) metaphor (e.g. AN ACTIVITY IS A PATH). 
Schematization can be carried to various lengths, leading up to very abstract 
metaphors (e.g. AN EVENT IS A PATH). However, even those very schematic 
metaphors are grounded in everyday physical experience.
Metonymic and metaphorical processes may interpenetrate, rendering the 
distinction between metonymy and metaphor gradual rather than absolute.
Goosens (1990) proposes a neologism metaphtonvmv for the interaction between 
metaphor and metonymy.
2.3.7 Conclusions
The four assumptions of the Cognitive Paradigm presented in Sections 2.3.2-
2.3.6 will be applied to the semantic analysis of the preposition in in Chapter 
Four.
2.4 Prepositions in Cognitive Linguistics
2.4.1 Introduction
In Section 2.4.2, English prepositions will be defined from the cognitive 
stance. Next, the notion of polysemy will be discussed in an attempt to determine
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how a lexico-semantic analysis of prepositions should be carried out (Section 
2.4.3).
2.4.2 Prepositions as atemporal relations
In Cognitive Linguistics, the traditional grammatical classes are defined 
semantically.
“ An expression’s grammatical class is determined by the nature of its profile . A 
basic distinction is drawn between nominal and relational expressions, 
depending on whether they profile a thing (abstractly defined) or a relationship. 
[...]
Within the class of relational expressions, verbs are distinguished from such 
classes as adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, infinitives, and participles in virtue 
of designating a process as opposed to an atemporal relation. A process is 
characterised as a relationship followed sequentially in its evolution through 
conceived time, whereas an atemporal relation - whether simple (stative) or 
complex (comprising multiple component states) - views a scene holistically.” 
(Langacker 1991: 5)
The items I am concerned with (prepositions) are defined as atemporal 
relations. Evidently, they do not normally occur in isolation. Their landmark 
(ground) is elaborated by a noun (a thing defined as a bounded space in some 
domain), and their traiector (figure) is elaborated by a noun or a verb phrase 
(a process). The latter adds a temporal profile. In the sentence The paint is in the 
jar, the trajector is elaborated by the noun paint, while the landmark is instantiated 
by another noun, the jar.
Combining prepositions with actual landmark and trajector elaborations is not 
a random process. The semantics of the prepositions sanction the use of particular 
landmarks and trajectors:
“ Grammar resides in patterns for combining simpler symbolic structures to form 
progressively more complex ones. Any such combination is referred to as a 
construction. It consists of two or more component structures that are integrated 
to form a composite structure.” (Langacker 1991: 5)
2.4.3 Polysemy
2.4.3.1 Defining polysemy
Providing a semantic analysis of a prepositional category is tantamount to 
resolving the problem of polysemy. Polysemy is a gradable concept. In 
recognising distinct senses of a word, one has to face the fuzzy borderline
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between ambiguity and vagueness. Ambiguity and vagueness may be seen as 
occupying opposite ends of a continuum (Section 4.3.2).
For example, the difference in meaning between the following uses of in 
appears rather small: The camel is in the desert; We are in Scotland. In those 
cases, in leans towards vagueness. In other words, a vague sentence/phrase is one 
which involves the same referent but different states of affairs.
On the other hand, the difference in meaning between the following uses 
appears more profound: The paint is in the jar; We are leaving in April. It takes 
more effort to think of a schema subsuming those two senses. In those cases, in 
leans towards ambiguity rather than vagueness. A sentence/phrase is ambiguous if 
it has distinct referents or different senses.
Metaphorically, vagueness and ambiguity may be perceived as proximity and 
distance between related senses.
Polysemy, homonymy, and ambiguity are three of the major issues that 
inevitably appear in any semantic analysis, and that have created diverse opinions 
among scholars. Polysemy is
“[...] as necessary to the study of meaning as are the semantic relations that exist 
among the words.” (Langacker 1987: 50)
In dealing with polysemy, scholars agree on the salience of context in 
determining which one of the senses is selected by the speaker/writer. However, a 
major controversial issue among scholars is whether the different uses of the 
prepositions correspond to separate, independent meanings, or whether those uses 
are all based on a common, or core, meaning, while the specific sense in a 
sentence is determined by the context.
2.4.3.2 Approaches to polysemy
In general, there seem to be three major approaches to polysemy. The first is 
the traditional view, which posits several meanings for each polysemous word 
without an attempt in consolidating those meanings. The other two are different 
versions of the core sense approach (Bennett 1975; Caramazza and Gober 1976). 
There are also those treatments which have their roots in Rosch’s (1978) theory of 
natural categorisation (Brugman 1981; Lindner 1982; Hawkins 1985; Herskovits 
1986; Vandeloise 1991).
In the present work, the data of prepositional polysemy will argue for a 
rejection of the minimal-entry lexicon, minimal in terms of number of senses 
entered, and in favour of a multiple-entry lexicon, which is consistent with a 
conception of the lexicon as an encyclopaedia (Hawkins 1985: 286). Therefore, it 
seems appropriate to present some of the approaches to polysemy that have 
emerged within the Cognitive Paradigm. The approaches selected will be 
frequently referred to in Chapter Four of this thesis.
The subsections below will present the treatments of polysemy developed by 
Brugman (1981), Lindner (1982), Hawkins (1985), Herskovits (1986), Vandeloise 
(1991). The first three approaches maintain a polysemous bias, where meaning is 
viewed as a complex family resemblance structure and individual senses are 
described holistically and interactionally by means of image schemas and their 
transformations. The last two analyses clearly favour a monosemic bias, in which 
specific interpretations are pragmatically determined.
2.4.3.2.1 Brugman
In defining polysemy, Brugman (1981) draws a crucial distinction between 
polysemy, which is a shift of sense, and functional shift. She stresses the 
importance of functional shift, noting that semantic shift can result from a new 
syntactic environment. By the same token, her definition of polysemy overrides 
the distinctions between lexical categories in favour of the conceptual category. 
Nevertheless, the role of the lexical category “preposition” remains of great 
explanatory power, as all nonprepositional uses of a preposition are derived from 
one or other sense of the preposition (Brugman 1981: l).7
Brugman’s study of the English lexical item over describes the preposition as a 
fairly complicated family resemblance structure, where the different senses are 
related as a chain of meanings. The polysemous item is described by means of 
pictorial representations which exploit
“[...] familiar spatial configurations existing in our experience of the world” 
(Brugman 1981: 3).
The semantic similarities between the various senses of over are established 
through similarity links and transformational links between schemas, resulting in a
7 Taylor (1989) acknowledges the general tendency in Cognitive Linguistics towards a semantic 
description o f a unified concept at the expense o f neglecting syntactic differences within a 
conceptual category.
chained hierarchical family resemblance structure imposed on the various senses 
of the word. Schemas are described at different levels of abstraction although no 
superschema subsuming the three central senses of the preposition over is 
provided (Section 4.4.2.1).
2.4.3.2.2 Lindner
Lindner’s (1982) approach to polysemy is based on the theory of natural 
categorisation, or the prototype model of category structure. After reviewing many 
uses of out and up, she maintains that neither collapsing all configurations into 
only one, nor suggesting multiple distinct lexical items would be appropriate. 
Instead, she believes in representing the full range of conventional uses of 
prepositions/particles as well as the unity of those uses (Section 2.3.6.2). To 
avoid classification leading up to an excessively large and counter-intuitive 
lexicon, Lindner holds that we ought not to look for all possible differences in 
meaning, but to look for sameness as far as we can. In her conclusion, Lindner 
claims that natural categories of senses display various levels of abstraction. 
Central schemas subsume different uses of a lexical item, whereas they 
themselves can be subsumed by a higher-order superschema. In such a fashion, 
then, Lindner unifies the diverse meanings of the particles out and up in a network 
of semantic extensions.
2.4.3.2.3 Hawkins
Hawkins’ (1985: 229-290) version of the theory of natural categorisation is 
what he calls "the central tendencies approach” (Hawkins 1985: 230). In this 
model, a natural category is defined not by clear boundaries, but by strong central 
tendencies internal to that category, and prototypes are only one of those central 
tendencies.
A natural category has two dimensions, vertical and horizontal, with significant 
central tendencies in each dimension. The vertical relation between category 
members is essentially that between superordinate and subordinate nodes in a 
taxonomic hierarchy. The horizontal dimension concerns relations between 
members at the same level of inclusiveness (Hawkins 1985: 232). It is this 
dimension that reflects the central importance of prototypes in category structure, 
a prototype being the central tendency within any given horizontal level of the 
category (Section 4.4.2.2). Thus, categories include both idealised prototypical
members and their approximations. Therefore, categories are to be defined not on 
the basis of their boundaries, but mostly by their clear cases because
“[...] non-prototypical members of the category share common attributes with 
structures both in and outside the category” (Hawkins 1985: 233).
Hawkins claims that the spatial predicates of a polysemous English preposition 
form a natural category.
“ The vertical and horizontal central tendencies characteristic of such a natural 
category have the significant effect of establishing certain primacy relations 
among the members of the category.” (Hawkins 1985: 263)
In brief, Hawkins (1985: 271) conceives of lexical disambiguation as a matter 
of probabilities determined by relations inherent in the prepositional category and 
modified by the interaction with context. His study, covering the majority of 
English spatial prepositions, is in line with the chained network of family 
resemblances proposed by Brugman (1981).
2.4.3.2.4 Herskovits
Herskovits (1986) proposes that the conceptual information attached to a 
spatial preposition should consist of an ideal meaning and a collection of use 
types:
“ The idea of an ideal meaning is that [...] it is manifested in all uses of the 
preposition, although shifted and distorted in various ways. [...] The whole 
prepositional category is stmctured by resemblance to an ideal relation; the 
spatial relation fulfilled in any given use of the preposition is distinctly derived 
from the ideal relation (it may be identical to it).” (Herskovits 1986:15)
Use types are
“[...] complex bundles of information corresponding roughly to various senses 
and idioms.” ( Herskovits 1986: 32)
Those use types are classes of uses of spatial prepositions which are related to 
the ideal meaning. As an illustration, I give Herskovits’ analysis of in, which 
looks as follows:
ideal meaning: " inclusion of a geometric construct in a one-, two-, or three- 
dimensional geometric construct."
use types:
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" spatial entity in container; 
gap/object embedded in physical object; 
physical object in the air;
physical object in outline of another, or of a group of objects;
spatial entity in part of space or environment;
accident/object part of physical or geometric object;
person in clothing;
spatial entity in area;
physical object in roadway;
person in institution;
participant in institution." (Herskovits 1986: 149)
Next to the ideal meaning and use types, there are also a number of what 
Herskovits calls “pragmatic near-principles”, which play an important part in a 
full account of the semantics of spatial prepositions. Those principles are: 
salience, relevance, tolerance, and typicality. They do not refer as much to the 
speaker-hearer relation as they reflect, once again, the importance of the 
experiential context within which a spatial preposition should be understood.
Herskovits’ analysis has affinities with the classical core sense approach in that 
it proposes one single, ideal meaning which is present in all the uses of a 
particular spatial preposition. Unlike in the core sense approach, this ideal 
meaning does not on its own make up the lexical entry of a preposition: the 
various shifted and distorted uses captured in the use types are also an integral part 
of the lexical information attached to the preposition. Moreover, each instance of 
the spatial preposition resembles, in some way, the ideal meaning, but the 
instances themselves are not interrelated through a family resemblance structure.
In the analysis to unfold in Section 4.3, I am going to demonstrate that the 
various instances of a spatial preposition can be proved to be related, and hence 
incline towards the family resemblance structure advocated by Brugman, Lindner 
and Hawkins, among others. Nevertheless, Herskovits’ fine achievement of 
having explicitly demonstrated the importance of spatial conceptualisations will 
be frequently referred to in Chapter Four.
2.4.3.2.5 Vandeloise
Vandeloise (1991) describes spatial prepositions as complex concepts which 
behave like a family resemblance. Instead of an invariable set of defining features, 
most spatial prepositions are characterised in terms of mutually overlapping sets
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of attributes. Dans (English in), for instance, expresses a CONTAINMENT 
relation: a complex concept whose definition employs the following attributes:
" The contained moves toward the container, and not vice versa.
The container controls the position of the contained, and not the other way 
round.
The contained is, at least partially, included in the container or in the convex 
closure of its containing part.” (Vandeloise 1984225)
The basic meaning of a given preposition is termed by Vandeloise its impetus. 
Vandeloise defines the impetus of a preposition as its original single signfie. The 
impetus involves a transparent and unambiguous correspondence between signifier 
and signified, which is at the beginning, diachronically speaking, of the 
development of the meaning potential for each preposition.8
Those three features need not be simultaneously present in the instances of 
dans, that is, they do not make a fixed set of criterial attributes. Instead, dans 
shows a network of overlapping featural configurations. However, Vandeloise 
restricts himself to those spatial prepositions with a fairly limited family 
resemblance structure. The complex concept CONTAINER/CONTENT 
characterising the French preposition dam , for instance, comprises only a limited 
set of possible attributes from which each of the mutually related featural 
configurations is made up. This, in turn, gives rise to a limited cluster of 
overlapping featural configurations.
In sum, the prepositional structure he proposes is that of a monosemous 
concept, where each of the featural configurations overlaps with all the others. 
This particular structure is sufficient only for a number of senses of spatial 
prepositions. Therefore, a functional-pragmatic interpretation of Cognitive 
Semantics, as advanced by Vandeloise, does not recognise that there is more 
flexibility in the way that extension from impetus to non-impetus uses occurs than 
is captured by naive physics and pragmatic-experiential similarity alone. Many 
spatial and abstract uses of prepositions can best be made sense of if recognised as 
the reflection of image-schematic extensions and transformations (Section 4.3.4).
8 The notion of impetus can be related to Clark's (1973) experimental findings in Developmental 
Psychology, as well as to Johnson's (1987) gestalt structures of image schemas.
2.4.4 Conclusions
Complex structures of family resemblances arising from image schemas and 
their transformations, as discussed by Brugman (1981), Lindner (1982) and 
Hawkins (1985), will be applied to analyse the 56 uses of the preposition in in 
Chapter Four.9 Herskovits’ (1986) notion of geometric descriptions and 
Vandeloise’s concept of the CONTAINMENT gestalt will also be appreciated 
(Section 4.2).
9 Further references to cognitive analyses of prepositions (Cuyckens 1991; Boers 1994) will be 
made in Chapter Four.
2.5 Summary of Chapter Two
In Chapter Two, I have argued that an adequate account of meaning requires 
viewing objects as entities relative to our interactions with the world and our 
projections on it. It has been postulated that properties are to be interpreted as 
interactional rather than inherent. Categories should be viewed as experiential 
gestalts defined via prototype (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:210). I have also pointed 
out that our experience is structured holistically in terms of experiential gestalts, 
whose dimensions emerge naturally from our experience (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980).
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l.C H A P T E R  T H R E E
A Cognitive-Semantic Analysis of 
the English Preposition in:
Part One
3.1 Orientation
Chapter Three presents the first part of the lexico-semantic analysis of the 
English preposition in. The current chapter is divided into two parts. In Section 
3.2, the theory of image schemas is presented. Sections 3.2.1-3.2.4 are devoted to 
defining image schemas. Section 3.3 provides evidence from Psycholinguistics, 
Cognitive Psychology and Developmental Psychology on the cognitive reality and 
relevance of image schemas.10
Section 3.4. presents a series of three experiments adapted from Gibbs et al 
(1994). The experiments are to demonstrate the cognitive reality of image 
schemas and their role in underlying the conceptual structure of polysemous 
words. Relations between cognitively salient image schemas will be proved to 
underlie image-schematic transformations motivating meaning extensions. As a 
result, the category structure of the English preposition in will be delineated. 
Three senses of the polysemous preposition will be distinguished on the basis of 
the underlying image schemas for CONTAINER11, PART-WHOLE and PATH.12 
The relevance of other image schemas (FORCE and FULL-EMPTY) is to be 
indicated in motivating sense elaborations and extensions, as well as explaining
10 In this, I am consistent with Lakoff s (1990) “cognitive commitment”, which emphasises the 
importance o f incorporating data from various related disciplines, such as Psycholinguistics, 
Cognitive and Developmental Psychology for our understanding o f language, and importance of 
the empirical evidence for the linguistic constructs.
11 A clear distinction should be made between the following two constructs:
1. the superordinate CONTAINER schema, subsuming the three senses o f the preposition in. In 
this sense, CONTAINER is understood as an experiential gestalt, whose internal structure 
motivates the category o f the senses o f in;
2. the basic-level CONTAINER schema, which motivates the meaning o f the IN-1 category 
(Section 4.3.6). It is presumed to include most o f the features o f the CONTAINER gestalt (Section 
4.3.4). By the same token, it is assumed to constitute the prototypical sense o f the category.
121 do not exclude the possibility o f there existing more senses of the preposition in. The three 
categories of senses are distinguished for the 56 uses of in that occur in the current analysis.
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family resemblance links between senses of the polysemous item (Section
3.4.2.1).
3.2 The theory of image schemas
3.2.1 Introduction
Most theories of linguistic meaning assume a distinction between mind and 
body, where meaning is a fixed and determinate product. For example, semantic 
features are seen as having no inherent meaning, but are made meaningful by 
virtue of their connections to objects and events in the objective world (Section 
2.3.2). Although people's sensory systems are sometimes viewed as contributing 
to how important conceptual distinctions that underlie linguistic meaning are 
acquired, few theories in Cognitive Psychology and Psycholinguistics 
acknowledge the role of human embodiment in motivating the concepts we have, 
or why linguistic symbols have the particular meanings they do.
Over the past ten years, cognitive linguists have begun to articulate their view 
that knowledge arises out of people's interactions with the world.13 Knowledge is 
seen not as being static, propositional and sentential, but as grounded in patterns 
of bodily experience. Section 3.2. is devoted to presenting the theory of those 
preconceptual patterns of experience.
3.2.2 Defining image schemas
" Recent empirical studies of categorisation, concept development, semantic 
structure and reasoning reveal the inadequacies of all theories that regard 
knowledge as static, propositional, and sentential. These studies show that 
conceptual structure and reason are grounded in patterns of bodily experience. 
Structures of our spatial/temporal orientations, perceptual interactions, and motor 
programs provide an imaginative basis for our knowledge of, and reasoning 
about, more abstract domains." (Johnson 1991: 7)
Those patterns are called image schemas (Section 2.3.3). They are different 
patterns of recurring bodily experiences that emerge through sensorimotor 
activity, and from our perceptual understanding of actions and events in the world.
13 The phenomenological tradition in Cognitive Linguistics is discussed in detail in Section 2.2.4.
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Hence, image schemas are experiential gestalts, whose character is cross-modal 
(Johnson 1987).14
According to Lakoff and Johnson, image schemas are grounded in everyday 
physical experience, but their logic is also used to metaphorically structure 
abstract experience.
Langacker considers image schemas to be innate:
“ For my purposes I find it useful to speak of basic image-schematic abilities. 
Moreover, counter to Johnson and to Lakoff, I am inclined to regard these 
abilities as innate. Rather than being acquired, or extracted from everyday bodily 
experience, I think of them as being initially manifested in such experience, and 
indeed, as making it possible for any structured experience to occur in the first 
place.” (Langacker 1993: 3)
Image schemas can generally be defined as dynamic analogs of spatial relations 
and movements in space.15 They are derived from perceptual and motor 
processes, but they themselves are not sensorimotor processes. Instead, image 
schemas are primary means by which we construct or constitute order and are not
"[...] mere passive receptacles into which experience is poured."
(Johnson 1987: 30)
Image schemas are imaginative and nonpropositional in nature, and operate as 
organising structures of experience on the level of bodily perception and 
movement. They exist across all perceptual modalities, something that must hold 
for there to be any sensorimotor co-ordination in our experience. They are at once 
visual, auditory, kinaesthetic, and tactile.
“ Mental imagery is not merely visual. And image-schemas are kinaesthetic in 
nature, that is, they have to do with the sense of spatial locations, movement, 
shape, etc. independent of any particular sensory modality. Evidence for this 
comes from mental imagery experiments conducted with congenitally blind 
people.” (Lakoff 1987: 445)
In referring to image schemas, we emphasise means of structuring particular 
experiences schematically so that we can give order and connectedness to our 
perceptions and conceptions (Johnson 1987).
141 reconcile the apparent contradiction by following both Johnson (1987) and Jackendoff (1983) 
in hypothesising that there is a prelinguistic form o f representation, which is common to all modes 
o f cognition. Jackendoff uses the term conceptual structure to refer to this level of representation.
15 They are dynamic in the sense that 1) they are structures o f an activity by which the experiences 
are organised and comprehended, and 2) unlike pictorial images, they are flexible and can take a 
number o f particular instantiations in different contexts (Johnson 1987).
Image schemas are presumably more abstract than ordinary images (rich 
images) and consist of dynamic spatial patterns that underlie the spatial relations 
and movement found in actual concrete images.16 Image schemas are emergent 
properties of unreflective bodily experience, while mental images are the result of 
more effortful cognitive processes. Mental images are generated by assembling 
the parts of the image, one part at a time.17
3.2.3 Image schemas and their transformations
Over two dozen (27) different image schemas and several image schema 
transformations appear regularly in people's everyday thinking, reasoning, and 
imagination (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987). Those image schemas cover a wide 
range of experiential structures that are pervasive in experience, have internal 
structure, and can be metaphorically elaborated to provide for our understanding 
of more abstract domains.
" Among some of the most prominent image schemas that are indispensable to 
any account of understanding and knowledge would be: object, figure-ground, 
container, cycle, force, balance, scalarity, interaction, centre-periphery.
They should not be understood as discrete little atomic units , but rather as 
recurring overlapping patterns in the ongoing flow of our experience of the 
world. These are the imaginative contours of our experiential interactions." 
(Johnson 1991: 12)
Image schemas are often linked together to form very natural relationships 
through different image schema transformations. They play a special role in 
linking perception and reason. Lakoff (1987: 443) distinguishes the following 
image-schematic transformations: PATH-FOCUS TO END-POINT FOCUS, 
MULTIPLEX TO MASS, FOLLOWING A TRAJECTORY, 
SUPERIMPOSITION. Image schema transformations motivate particular 
extensions from a schema in the domain of physical space by virtue of their 
perceptive/cognitive naturalness:
16 In very many respects, image schemas are the same as lexical conceptual structures in 
Jackendoff s Conceptual Semantics. In that respect, image schemas are attributed with the role o f  
being the link between experience and language. In other words, image schemas not only make 
metaphorical language possible; they make language itself possible.
17An image is a form of representation specific to sight, and the object thereof is a specific token o f  
a particular referent. Image schemas are associated with neither a specific mode o f cognition nor 
any particular referent. W e are assuming that image schemas are intentional, and as such, they 
serve as information structures that allow us to identify appropriate referents for a linguistic 
symbol. They are also patterns by which we organise our experience.
“ In short, these schema transformations are anything but arbitrary. They are 
direct reflections of our experiences, which may be visual or kinaesthetic.” 
(Lakoff 1987: 443)
The concept of motivation must be differentiated from prediction, on the one 
hand, and arbitrariness, on the other hand. Motivation means that sense extensions 
are not arbitrary, but are constrained by the embodied image-schematic knowledge 
and by types of cognitive links relating different senses. The senses are related in 
at least three different ways: through image-schematic transformations, through 
metonymic relations, and through metaphorical instantiations of image schemas in 
different domains of people's visual experiences (Section 2.3.6).18
3.2.4 The Invariance Hypothesis
One of the important theoretical ideas in Cognitive Semantics is that image 
schemas and their transformations provide part of the foundation for thought, 
reasoning and imagination. The same image schemas can be instantiated in many 
different kinds of domains because the internal structure of a single schema can be 
metaphorically understood. Image schemas have an internal structure which 
determines the roles those image schemas can play in structuring various concepts 
and in patterns of reasoning.19
The same word is used for various domains because they are structurally 
related by the same sort of underlying image schemas, and are metaphorically 
elaborated from them.
“ When we understand something as having an abstract structure, we understand 
that structure in terms of image schemas. In particular, I maintain that:
Categories (in general) are understood in terms of CONTAINER schemas.20
1 furtherm ore, Herskovits (1986) proposes “sense shifts” and “tolerance shifts” as pragmatic 
transformations o f prepositional meaning (Section 2.4.3.2.4). The “sense shift” accounts for the 
senses o f a spatial preposition that only perceptually resemble the conditions o f the “ideal” 
prepositional meaning. For example, the relations in The wrinkles on his forehead  only 
perceptually resemble the relations of contiguity and support described as the “ideal” meaning of 
on , but this resemblance motivates the use o f on in this example. The “tolerance shifts” are gradual 
deviations from the “ideal” meaning in terms of geometric angle or distance. For example, the 
expression The pear is in the bowl is not strictly true when the pear is on top o f other fruit in the 
bowl, and thus outside the boundaries o f the bowl itself. However, it is allowed (it is "almost 
true"), since the distance between the pear and the upper boundary o f the bowl is very small.
19 It is important to note that image schemas are not abstract semantic primitives or propositional 
symbols. The propositional symbols are arbitrary, in the sense that their internal structure does not 
play any role in what they mean and how they interact. They are inherently meaningless, and they 
are finite in nature. In contrast, image schemas are not arbitrary, in the sense that they have an 
internal structure that plays a crucial role in what they mean and how they interact. Image schemas 
are grounded in bodily experiences, inherently meaningful, and analog in nature (Lakoff 1987).
20 Johnson (1987: 39-40) describes how the CONTAINER schema enters into our understanding 
o f reasoning. He claims that we understand categories metaphorically as containers. The principle
Hierarchical structure is understood in terms of part-whole schemas and up-down 
schemas.
Linear quantity scales are understood in terms of up-down schemas and linear 
order schemas.” (Lakoff 1987: 283)
Abstract thought is structured by means of image schemas, which are grounded 
in everyday physical experience. In other words, abstract thought has a bodily 
basis:
“ Schemas that structure our bodily experience preconceptually have a basic 
logic. Preconceptual structural correlations in experience motivate metaphors 
that map that logic onto abstract domains. Thus, what has been called abstract 
reason has a bodily basis in our everyday physical functioning. It is this that 
allows us to base a theory of meaning and rationality on aspects of bodily 
functioning.” (Lakoff 1987: 278)
The Invariance Hypothesis determines how image-schematic structure is 
preserved in abstract domains.
“ In metaphoric mapping, for those components of the source and target domains 
determined to be involved in the mapping, preserve the image-schematic 
structure of the target, and import as much image-schematic structure from the 
source as is consistent with that preservation.” (Turner 1993: 302)
3.2.5 Conclusions
In Section 3.2,1 have demonstrated that image schemas are semantic structures 
that encapsulate the most basic elements of human experience. According to the 
Invariance Hypothesis (Lakoff 1990; Turner 1993), image schemas represent the 
information applied to a target domain by metaphoric language. Hence, image 
schemas are patterns which underlie experience, literal language and figurative 
expressions.
"Either P or non-P" (Law o f the Excluded Middle) has an intuitive basis in our daily experience 
with CONTAINMENT. This principle holds, however, for the formal logic o f metaphorical 
containers.
A second logical relation that is experientially motivated by CONTAINMENT is "transitivity". 
Our experience with containers and bounded spaces and their properties is the basis for our 
understanding of the transitivity of set membership. Sets are understood as containers for their 
members and their subsets.
A third point about logical structure that appears to be tied to the CONTAINMENT schema 
concerns the nature of negation. W e understand our experience as broken into categories (of 
objects, events, states, properties, and relations). W e understand those categories as abstract 
containers so that whatever is within the category is in the appropriate container. Thus, a negation 
of some type is a category of experience which is understood as characterising what is outside the 
container.
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3.3 Evidence for the reality of image schemas
3.3.1 Introduction
In Section 3.3 of the current chapter, I will provide evidence from 
Psycholinguistics, Cognitive and Developmental Psychology for the cognitive 
reality of image schemas and their transformations.
3.3.2 Psycholinguistics
Gibbs et al. (1994) attempted to experimentally show that different senses of the 
polysemous word stand are motivated by different image schemas that arise from 
our bodily experience of standing. This psycholinguistic research has demonstrated 
that people make sense of different uses of stand because of their tacit 
understanding of several image schemas that arise partly from the ordinary bodily 
experience of standing. Those image schemas not only produce the grounding for 
many physical senses of stand, but also underlie people's understanding of 
complex, metaphorical uses. People perceive different senses of stand as similar 
partly on the basis of the underlying image-schematic profile for each use of the 
word in context.
3.3.3 Cognitive Psychology
The possible relevance of Cognitive Psychology research to image schemas was 
first noted by Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987). They both described several 
studies on mental imagery that supported the idea that image schemas and their 
transformations play an important role in cognitive functioning.
One topic that may be especially relevant to image schemas and their 
transformations is the connection between imagery and perception. Gibbs et 
al.1994, 1995) provide support for image schemas in that people seem able to 
access certain modes of cognition, either recall of verbal information or visual 
imagery, through multiple channels, such as kinaesthetic and verbal report.
Also classic studies in mental rotation of images provide evidence for image 
schemas and their transformations. We are constrained in our mental processes of 
manipulating things similarly to how we are constrained in our physical ability to 
manipulate things in the real world (Gibbs et al. 1995).
Johnson concludes that
"[...] we can perform mental operations on image schemas that are analogs of 
spatial operations." (Johnson 1987:25)
3.3.4 Developmental Psychology
There exists a body of evidence that Developmental Psychology provides on the 
primacy of the concept of CONTAINMENT, which underlies the meaning of the 
preposition in. CONTAINMENT is quite relevant to preverbal thinking and is an 
early part of conceptual development.21 Infants appear to have a concept of 
containers as places where things disappear and appear (Vandeloise 1991). Image 
schemas may explain some of those data.
The CONTAINMENT schema has three structural elements, namely, the 
interior, the boundary and the exterior, which primarily arise from two sources:
- perceptual analysis of the differentiation of figure from ground, that is, seeing 
obj ects as bounded and having an inside that is separate from the outside;
- perceptual analysis of objects going into and out of containers (Gibbs et al. 
1995).
Let us consider briefly the image-schematic structure emerging from our 
experience of physical CONTAINMENT (Section 4.3.4).
Our encounter with CONTAINMENT and BOUNDEDNESS is one of the 
most pervasive features of our bodily experience (Section 4.4.2.4). We are 
intimately aware of our bodies as three-dimensional containers into which we put 
certain things (food, water, air), and out of which other things emerge (food and 
water wastes, blood, air). From the beginning, we experience constant physical 
CONTAINMENT in our surroundings (those things that envelop us). We move in 
and out of rooms, clothes, vehicles, and numerous kinds of bounded spaces. We 
manipulate objects placing them in containers (cups, boxes, bags). In each of those 
cases, there are repeatable spatial and temporal organisations. In other words, there 
are typical schemas for physical CONTAINMENT.
If we look for common structure in our many experiences of being in 
something, or for locating something within another thing, we find recurring
21 Vandeloise (1991) presents an extensive discussion on the child's acquisition of spatial 
prepositions in, on and under. The preposition in has been experimentally proved to be acquired 
before on and under (Clark 1973). The primacy of in in child's language acquisition seems to 
emerge from the primacy of the functional relation of CONTAINMENT. Those findings tacitly 
prove the advantage of the functional approach to the meaning of concepts as opposed to 
geometric or topological analyses. Developmental Psychology also provides some insight into the 
nature of prototypical containers. As containers with upward opening elicited better responses 
than
organisation of structures: the experiential basis for IN-OUT orientation is that of 
spatial BOUNDEDNESS. The most experientially salient sense of 
BOUNDEDNESS seems to be that of three-dimensional CONTAINMENT. If we 
eliminate one or two of those dimensions, we get equally important two- or one­
dimensional CONTAINMENT.22 In those latter cases, however, the relevant 
experience is chiefly one of differentiation and separation, such as when a point 
lies in a circle or in a line segment. Physical IN-OUT orientation involves 
separation, differentiation and enclosure which implies restriction and limitation.
There are thus at least five important entailments, or consequences, of those 
recurring experiential image-schematic structures for IN-OUT orientation:
1. the experience of CONTAINMENT typically involves protection from or 
resistance to external forces;
2. CONTAINMENT also limits and restricts forces within the container; 
because of this restraint of forces, the contained object gets a relative fixity of 
location;
3. this relative fixing of location within the container means that the contained 
object becomes either accessible or inaccessible to the view of some observer. It is 
either held so that it can be observed, or else the container itself blocks or hides 
the objects from view;
4. finally, we experience transitivity of CONTAINMENT, if B is in A whatever 
is in B is also in A.
These are the implications of the internal structure of the CONTAINMENT 
image schemas. I do not insist that there must be only one central schema that 
covers all cases of the meaning of in used for physical CONTAINMENT. Rather, 
there are a small number of related schematic structures that emerge from our 
constant encounters with physical CONTAINMENT (Section 4.3.4). What is 
important is that those recurrent patterns are relatively small in number, they are 
nonpropositional, and yet, they have a sufficient internal structure to generate 
entailments and constrain inferences.
Another important conclusion is the role of our body in the CONTAINER 
schema (Section 2.2.4). It is believed that our sense of IN-OUT orientation is most 
intimately tied to our experience of our own bodily orientation: the body can be
containers with an opening on the side, the first category is more likely to constitute the prototype 
(Section 4.3.6.2.3).
22 Developmental Psychology research gives primacy to the CONTAINMENT schema involving 
three-dimensional entities 
(Clark 1973).
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both the container and the thing contained. Most importantly, IN-OUT image 
schemas emerge first in our bodily experience, in our perception and movement.23
Another aspect that seems to be involved in an early concept of 
CONTAINMENT is that of SUPPORT. True containers not only envelop things 
but support them as well. Infants are surprised when containers without bottoms 
appear to hold things (Vandeloise 1991). Similarly, infants could judge whether a 
block could be supported by a box open at the top only when they were able to 
compare the widths of the block and the box in a single glance as the one was 
lowered into the other. Those findings suggest that the notions of 
CONTAINMENT and SUPPORT may be closely related from an early age.
An infant's understanding of opening and closing is also related to the 
development of the concept of CONTAINMENT (Gibbs et al. 1995).
3.3.5 Conclusions
Image schemas organise our bodily and perceptual experiences into coherent 
meaningful patterns. They represent the base knowledge and underlie the physical 
senses of the word. The senses of a polysemous word are assumed to be linked to 
the underlying embodied image-schematic knowledge in a radial category structure 
(Section 2.3.6.1). The abstract senses are extended from the more central, physical 
senses. The senses are related through different linking mechanisms, such as 
image-schematic transformations, metonymic extensions, and metaphorical 
instantiations (Section 2.3.6.3). The intensive links between cognitively distinct 
image schemas explain why different image schemas all happen to motivate the 
senses of one lexical item. Moreover, due to the intensive links between image 
schemas, identification of the dominant one for a particular sense of the word is 
usually only a matter of emphasis
The idea that different senses of in are instantiations of the same image schemas 
explains why different senses of in are perceived as related by speakers and make 
sense in the way they do (Section 3.4).
23 Although Johnson (1987) emphasises bodily experience as the basis of the understanding of 
CONTAINMENT, it is not obvious that bodily experience per se is required for perceptual 
analysis to take place. Indeed, it might be easier to analyse the sight of milk going in and out of a 
cup than milk going into or out of one's mquth (Gibbs et al. 1995).
3.4 Experiments
3.4.1 Introduction
The purpose of Section 4.3 of the current chapter is to present the category 
structure of the English preposition in. The three senses comprising the 56 uses of 
in will be revealed on the basis of the image-schematic approach discussed in 
Section 3.3. Emphasis will be laid on various links between image schemas, 
which result in image-schematic transformations leading to sense extensions and 
elaborations (Section 3.4.3.1).
Cognitive linguists and philosophers proposed the image-schematic approach 
to meaning and described various ways in which image schemas motivate sense 
extensions and sense relations in polysemous words (Section 2.4.3.2). The 
question that cognitive psychologists and psycholinguists address is to what extent 
the embodied image schemas and the image-schematic motivation of senses are 
psychologically real.24
One way to test the hypothesis of the image-schematic basis of sense relations 
is to investigate whether people have some tacit understanding of relations 
between image schemas and various senses of a polysemous word, and whether 
this tacit knowledge can be used to predict the judgements of conceptual similarity 
for various senses of the polysemous word.
Chapter Three of this thesis offers such an empirical test of the image- 
schematic basis of relations between various senses of the polysemous spatial 
preposition in. It investigates whether people tacitly recognise connections 
between image schemas relevant to the bodily experience of the relationship in 
and various senses of the word in, including abstract and metaphorical senses, and 
examines whether this tacit knowledge can be used to predict people's judgements 
of conceptual similarity for various senses of in. This work does not claim that 
image schemas play a role in people's on-line production and understanding of 
word meaning. It only suggests, in the experimental part, that the embodied 
image-schematic knowledge motivates speakers' use and understanding of why 
various senses of a polysemous word such as in mean what they do.
24 Psychological evidence is important for two reasons. First, cognitive linguists, following the 
“cognitive commitment” to construct theories that are consistent with what is known about the 
mind and brain, should be aware o f the experimental findings from neighbouring disciplines, 
especially data that bear on the possible connections between perception, thought, and language. 
Second, experiments minimise the uncertainty in making personal inferences about thought and 
behaviour in whole populations of people.
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Having investigated the basis of sense relatedness in the polysemous word in, I 
will address the issues of sense motivation and sense relatedness in Chapter Four of 
this thesis.25
3.4.1.1 Description of the experiments
The study had the following plan. First, several image schemas relevant to the 
bodily experience of in were identified (Experiment 1). Second, the 56 uses of in 
were sorted into categories according to similarity of meaning (Experiment 2). 
Finally, the image-schematic profiles of those 56 uses were obtained (Experiment 
3). The three experiments were adapted from Gibbs et al. (1994).
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to identify several maj or schemas that are 
relevant to the bodily experience of in. The important point was to identify the 
embodied image schemas. To achieve this goal the participants, twelve 
undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow, were gathered in a large 
empty room. They were tested in three groups of four people each. During the 
experiment the door remained closed. The participants were asked to move 
around the room, jump and touch the walls, to get a sense of what it meant to be in 
a room. Afterwards, the participants were read the descriptions of 12 image 
schemas, one at a time, and asked to evaluate how appropriate each image schema 
was to their experience of being in a room on the scale of 1 to 7 with 1 meaning 
"not at all appropriate" and 7 meaning "very appropriate". The order of image 
schemas was counterbalanced across the participants. The 12 image schemas were 
selected in part on the basis of Vandeloise’s (1991) analysis of FORCE and 
perceptual relations involved in French spatial prepositions, such as SUPPORT, 
VISIBILITY and CONTROL, and from Johnson's (1987) list of 27 important 
image schemas structuring people's every day reasoning and imagination, such as 
CONTAINER and PATH (Section 3.2.3). Some image schemas (such as 
CONTAINER) were expected to be very important to the preconceptual 
experience connected with the preposition in, whereas other image schemas (such 
as LINK) were expected to be far less important to the bodily experience of in 26
25 Brugman (1981), Vandeloise (1991) and Cuyckens (1993) have examined how image schemas 
represent the underlying meaning that relates the seemingly disparate senses of prepositions. The 
image-schematic structure motivates veib-particle constructions (Lindner 1982), as well as 
explains the many kinds of cognitive relationships that can form the basis of the extension of a 
categoiy, such as Japanese hon (Lakoff 1987). More recent investigations from linguistics and 
philosophy examined the role that image schemas have in motivating abstract and metaphorical 
concepts, such as causation, death and morality (Lakoff and Turner 1989).
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experience connected with the preposition in, whereas other image schemas (such 
as LINK) were expected to be far less important to the bodily experience of in 26 
On the basis of the participants’ ratings, seven image schemas, most relevant to the 
bodily experience of in, were identified (Section 3.4.2.1).
Experiment 2 was designed to obtain judgements of similarity for different 
physical and non-physical uses of in. The participants, 12 undergraduate students 
from the University of Glasgow who did not participate in Experiment 1, were to 
sort 56 different uses of in into three groups according to the similarity of 
meaning. I considered it important that the number of groups should be limited if 
analysable results were to be obtained. The 56 sentences with the preposition in 
were printed on slips of paper, one use per slip. The examples were selected from 
the Oxford English Dictionary and previous analyses of English spatial prepositions 
(Herkovits 1986; Vandeloise 1984, 1991; Cuyckens 1993). I specifically attempted 
to obtain a wide range of uses for in, with special emphasis on the fact that a 
sufficient variety of spatial uses of the preposition were included in the list of 
examples.
Spatial uses are claimed to motivate metaphoric extensions (Section 1.2). 
Therefore a plethora of spatial instantiations of in is likely to motivate a large 
number of metaphoric ones, thus proving an assumption that the range of 
meanings of polysemous items is to be explained in terms of image schemas as well 
as their metonymic and metaphoric extensions (Section 2.3.6). My hypothesis was 
that the uses of in that would be similar in meaning and grouped together in 
Experiment 2 would have similar image-schematic structure. The image-schematic 
profiles for the 56 uses of in were to be obtained independently in Experiment 3. 
The aim of Experiment 2 was simply to obtain the groups of conceptually similar 
uses of in. However, I do not claim that those 56 examples represent entirely 
different senses nor do they reflect all aspects of how in is used in contemporary 
English. *
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to obtain image-schematic profiles for the 56 
uses of in. The assumption was that the groupings of conceptually similar senses
26 It is important to note that image schemas, being embodied preconceptual meaning structures, 
are not necessarily consciously represented or activated during on-line language processing.
Even though they motivate various abstract concepts, they themselves are not necessarily the 
semantic representations of those concepts. For example, the image schema CONTAINER can 
motivate various concepts. However, the CONTAINER image schema itself is on the level of 
preconceptual bodily meaning, which is not necessarily semantically represented.
obtained in Experiment 2 could be predicted on the basis of image-schematic 
profiles for those uses obtained in Experiment 3.
The subjects for Experiment 3 were ten members of staff at Glasgow 
University, from the Department of Slavonic Languages. They were all native 
speakers of English with some expertise in linguistics. Each of the subjects was 
provided with a list of the 56 uses of the preposition in. They were also each 
given a list of image schemas relevant for the bodily experience of in: 
CONTAINER, PART-WHOLE, MERGING, PATH, CONSTRAINT, 
PRESSURE, SUPPORT. An additional list of five schemas, CONTROL, 
CONTACT, INVISIBILITY, FULL-EMPTY, CENTRE-PERIPHERY, was 
provided in case the subjects felt it impossible to define the meaning of an 
example by limiting themselves to the most relevant seven image schemas. It was 
strongly indicated though that responses should be focused on the first seven 
image schemas. The subjects' task was to decide which image schema most 
appropriately reflected the meaning of each individual use of in. In other words, 
they were to place the name of an appropriate image schema next to each use of 
the preposition. They were given one week in which to complete the task. 
Although the subjects were requested to limit their image-schematic profiles to the 
most central schema only, it was assumed that more than one image schema 
would be provided in some cases. The assumption was based on the fact that most 
of the participants found the task extremely difficult. They had problems with 
understanding the definitions of the schemas (Section 3.4.2). Moreover, the 
participants, in some cases, could not see the correlation between the schemas and 
a specific use of the preposition. Abstract examples seemed to cause most 
problems.
Nevertheless, the underlying hypothesis was that central examples of a 
given image-schematic profile would not need additional refinements and would 
thus be described by one image schema only. Non-central cases, on the other 
hand, were predicted to have profiles involving many image schemas. However, 
multi-schematic profiles were assumed to be assigned in a way that made group 
membership clear in most cases.
3.4.2 Experiment One
The descriptions of all 12 image schemas employed in Experiment 1 are 
presented in Table 1 below.
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CONTAINER - refers to you being bounded and enclosed while you are in the 
room. Do you feel a sense of CONTAINER while you are in the room?
FULL-EMPTY - refers to your experience of some physical or mental entity being 
filled or emptied while you are in the room. Do you feel a sense of FULL-EMPTY 
while you are in the room?
SUPPORT - refers to the sense of you being supported by the room while you are 
in it. Do you feel a sense of SUPPORT while you are in the room?
PATH - refers to the sense of you moving along some course while you are in the 
room. Do you feel a sense of PATH while you are in the room?
CONTROL - refers to the sense of you being controlled by the room while you are 
in it. Do you feel a sense of CONTROL while you are in the room?
INVISIBILITY - refers to the sense of you being invisible while you are in the 
room. Do you feel a sense of INVISIBILITY while you are in the room?
MERGING - refers to your sense that you and the room are becoming one entity 
while you are in it. Do you feel a sense of MERGING while you are in the room?
PRESSURE - refers to your sense of exerting some pressure on the room while 
you are in it. Do you feel a sense of PRESSURE while you are in the room?
CONSTRAINT -refers to your sense of being unable to perform certain 
movements while being in the room. Do you feel a sense of CONSTRAINT while 
you are in the room?
CENTRE-PERIPHERY-refers to you being in the centre and the room being in 
the background while you are in it. Do you feel a sense of CENTRE-PERIPHERY 
while you are in the room?
CONTACT - refers to your sense of having some physical contact with the room 
while you are in it. Do you feel a sense of CONTACT while you are in the room?
PART-WHOLE - refers to your sense of being part of the room while you are in 
it. Do you feel a sense of PART-WHOLE while you are in the room?
Table 1. Descriptions of 12 image schemas in Experiment 1
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3.4.2.1 Results and Discussion
The mean ratings of appropriateness of 12 image schemas relevant to the 
bodily experience of in are presented in Table 2 below.
I m a g e  s c h e m a Rating (1-7)
CONTAINER 6.43
PATH 6.30
MERGING 6.18
PART-WHOLE 6.02
CONSTRAINT 5.67
PRESSURE 4.80
SUPPORT 3.86
FULL-EMPTY 3.56
CONTACT 2.36
CONTROL 1.77
INVISIBILITY 1.60
CENTRE- 1.24
PERIPHERY
Table 2. Mean ratings of appropriateness of 12 image 
schemas relevant to the bodily experience of in
The results obtained show that five image schemas are the most important to 
the bodily experience of in. These are: CONTAINER, PATH, MERGING, PART- 
WHOLE and CONSTRAINT. The results of the semantic analysis will 
demonstrate the relevance of the FULL-EMPTY schema for the CONTAINER 
gestalt (Sections 4.3.6-4.3.8). Therefore, the schema will be included in the 
current section.27
The strong hypothesis underlying the study is that there are some correlations 
between image schemas (Section 3.2.3). Thus, I perceive the following 
correspondences between the six image schemas enumerated above:
27 The schemas for CONSTRAINT, PRESSURE and SUPPORT are subsumed under the FORCE 
gestalt (Johnson 1987).
- links between the CONTAINER schema and the FORCE schema. Johnson 
(1987) notes the relevance of inside and outside forces acting upon the contained 
entity (Section 3.3.4);
- links between the CONTAINER schema and the PATH schema. The contained 
object moves (is moved) along a path. Besides, the contained entity can move 
inside the container;
- links between the CONTAINER schema and the PART-WHOLE schema. The 
correlation has the following experiential basis: forces acting on the contents of 
the container can increase their magnitude to such an extent as to incorporate the 
distinct contained entity within the containing entity;
- links between the CONTAINER schema and the FULL-EMPTY schema. The 
correlation is experientially motivated by the fact that containers can be filled 
(Section 4.2.3.1.3);
- a transition between the PART-WHOLE schema and the MERGING schema. 
The experiential basis consists in the fact that the entities constituting parts and 
wholes respectively are similar in nature. The perceived similarity can reach the 
level at which we are no longer able to distinguish parts within the whole. Thus, 
parts have merged to compose a whole. The increased degree of forceful 
interactions facilitates the process;
- links between the FULL-EMPTY schema and the PATH schema based on the 
fact that the action of filling a container is conceptualised along a vertical PATH 
schema;
- links between the schemas for SUPPORT, CONSTRAINT, and PRESSURE 
based on the superordinate schema for FORCE (Johnson 1987).
Many of the relations between image schemas enumerated above presuppose 
others. For instance, if the PATH schema is related to the CONTAINER schema it 
is at the same time correlated with the FORCE schema. I assume that such 
inferences are clear enough and do not require elaboration. The reality of those 
correlations will be experientially demonstrated in Section 3.4.4.1.
Consequently, it is postulated that image schemas relevant to the preconceptual 
experience of in be defined as follows:
1. CONTAINER
The CONTAINER schema consists of the inside, the boundaries and the outside 
(Section 3.3.4). Lakoff (1990) claims that the CONTAINER schema has the
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following cognitive inference structure. The containing entity exerts control over 
the contained object. The control is to be understood as the trajector being unable 
to exit the container. The more boundaries the containing landmark possesses and 
the denser its internal structure, the more difficult it is for the trajector to become 
separated from the landmark.
2. PATH
The PATH image schema consists of the starting point, the trajectory and the end 
point. The schema lends itself to a PATH-FOCUS TO END-POINT FOCUS 
transformation (Section 3.2.3). It presupposes the vector of (potential) movement 
(Section 2.2.5).
3. PART-WHOLE to MERGING
The image schema has the following characteristics
- the whole acts as a background for its parts;
- the parts are typically more salient than the whole;
- if the process evolves towards MERGING, it is difficult to distinguish the 
components of the schema (Section 4.2.3.2.1);
4. FORCE
Johnson (1987) distinguishes the following features of the schema for FORCE:
- interaction,
- directionality (a vector quality of FORCE),
- a single path of motion, which is tied up with the vector quality of forceful 
movement,
- origins and sources of FORCES,
- degrees of power or intensity of FORCE.
The following image schemas for FORCE can be further distinguished:
1. COMPULSION (PRESSURE),
2. BLOCKAGE,
3. COUNTERFORCE,
4. DIVERSION,
5. REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT,
6. ENABLEMENT,
7. ATTRACTION.
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5. FULL-EMPTY
The schema is defined along the PATH schema. The degree to which a 
container is filled corresponds to the position of the filling entity on the vertical 
axis.
The image schemas and relations between them revealed in Experiment 1 
above constitute the structure underlying the meaning of the English preposition 
in (Section 4.3.4).
3.4.3 Experiment Two
The 56 uses of in employed in Experiment 2 are presented in Table 3 below.
1. WE ARE IN SCOTLAND.
2. HE IS IN BED.
3. MARY IS IN HER TWENTIES.
4. HE IS DEAF IN ONE EAR.
5. HE REFUSED TO SAY ANYTHING IN REPLY TO THE QUESTION.
6. HE W AS SHOT IN THE HEAD.
7. DO YOU RECOGNISE THAT M AN IN JEANS?
8. ONE IN TEN PEOPLE HAD PROBLEMS WITH READING.
9. THE CIRCLE IS DRAW N IN A TRIANGLE.
10. WE ARE LEAVING IN APRIL.
11. WHO IS THE WOMAN IN THAT PAINTING?
1 2 . 1 HAVE GOT SOMETHING IN MY EYE.
13. THERE IS A WARDROBE IN THE CORNER.
14. HE IS DOING A DEGREE IN PHILOSOPHY.
15. PUT THE BUTTER IN THE FRIDGE.
16. THE BRAIN IS IN THE HEAD.
17. THE MAGAZINE IS IN THE RACK.
18. THERE IS A HOLE IN THE ROAD.
19. THE MONUMENT IS IN GRANITE.
20. THE SUN  IS IN MY FACE.
21. HE IS IN THE BEDROOM.
2 2 . 1 GOT STUCK IN A TRAFFIC JAM.
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23. GET IN THE CAR.
24. THEY LIVE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE WOOD.
25. THE HOUSE IS IN RUINS.
26. SHE IS IN THE NEWS.
27. THE PAINT IS IN THE JAR.
28. THERE IS A PAIN IN MY BACK.
29. JERSEY IS IN THE ENGLISH CHANNEL.
30. THE SNAKE IS IN THE GRASS.
31. THERE IS A  STONE IN MY HAND.
32. THERE IS A GOLD THREAD IN THE CARPET.
33. THE SQUIRREL IS IN THE TREE.
34. IN REFUSING TO GO ABROAD, HE MISSED HIS CHANCE.
35. THERE ARE TOYS IN THE WINDOW.
36. SLICE THE POTATOES IN TWO.
37. WE WATCHED THE SCENE IN HORROR.
38. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN LOVE?
39. YOUR CAR IS IN VERY GOOD CONDITION.
40. THE SOCKET IS IN THE WALL.
41. HE SPOKE IN RUSSIAN.
4 2 . 1 HAVE BEEN WAITING IN THIS QUEUE FOR AGES.
43. THE NAILS ARE IN THE BOARD.
44. THE DIP IN THE GRAPH IS VERY SIGNIFICANT.
45. HE LIVES IN OUR NEIGHBOURHOOD.
46. THE CAMEL IS IN THE DESERT.
47. THERE IS A CURVE IN THE ROAD.
48. SHE TAKES MILK IN HER COFFEE.
49. M Y FOOT IS IN THE STIRRUP.
50. HE WAS STANDING IN THE DOORWAY.
51. FISH SWIM IN THE WATER.
52. SHE HAS GOT A CHILD IN HER ARMS.
53. HE HAS GOT A RING IN HIS EAR.
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54. THE KETTLE HANGS IN THE FIRE.
55. THE GOLD IS IN THE ORE.
56. DINNER WILL BE READY IN TEN MINUTES.
Table 3. The 56 uses of the English preposition in
3.4.3.1 Results and Discussion
Three groups of senses were identified for the preposition in. Group 
membership was established on the basis of the frequency of occurrence. The 
numbers placed next to each example show how often a given item occurred in a 
particular group. The limits of a group were established on the basis of 
“anchoring examples”. These were the instances which always or in most cases 
occurred in each of the respective groups. They are placed at the top of each list 
of senses in Table 4 below.
G RO UP ONE G RO UP TW O
1. The brain is in the head. 12 1. There is a curve in the road. 4
2. He is in the bedroom. 12 2. Fish swim in the water. 4
3. The paint is in the jar. 12 3. There is a gold thread in the 
carpet. 4
4. The squirrel is in the tree. 12 4. She takes milk in her 
coffee. 4
5. There is a wardrobe in the corner. 10 5. He is deaf in one ear. 4
6. The snake is in the grass. 10 6. The gold is in the ore. 4
7. She has got a child in her arms. 10 7. She is in the news.
8. There are toys in the window. 10 8. Who is that woman in the 
painting? 3
9 . 1 have been waiting in this queue for 
ages. 10
9. Do you recognise that man in 
jeans? 3
10. They live in the middle o f the wood. 10 10. He lives in our 
neighbourhood. 3
11. The camel is in the desert. 10
12. The dip in the graph is very 
significant. 10
13 The socket is in the wall. 10
14. The nails are in the board. 10 GROUP TH REE
15. He has got a ring in his ear. 8 1. He spoke in Russian. 10
16. W e are in Scotland. 8 2. He is doing a degree in 
philosophy. 10
17. He is in bed. 8 3. Dinner will be ready in ten 
minutes. 10
1 8 . 1 have got something in my eye. 8 4. Mary is in her twenties. 8
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19. The magazine is in the rack. 7 5. In refusing to go abroad, he 
missed his chance. 8
20. The circle is drawn in a triangle. 7 6. Your car is in very good 
condition. 8
21. Jersey is in the English Channel. 7 7. W e are leaving in April. 7
22. There is a pain in my back. 7 8. The house is in ruins. 7
23. There is a hole in the road. 7 9. The sun is in my face. 7
24. W e watched the scene in horror. 6 10. He refused to say anything in 
reply to the question. 6
25. Have you ever been in love? 6 11. He was shot in the head. 6
26. Get in the car. 5 12. The monument is in granite. 6
2 7 . 1 got stuck in the traffic Jam. 5 13. Slice the potatoes in two. 4
28. My foot is in the stirrup. 5 14. One in ten people had 
problems with reading. 4
29. Put the butter in the 
fridge. 5
30. There is a stone in my hand. 5
31. He was standing in the doorway. 5
32. The kettle hangs in the fire. 5
Table 4. The three groups of senses of the preposition in
On the basis of Experiment 2 ,1 can suggest that the subjects perceived 
distinctions between the uses of in clear enough to sort the uses into three 
different senses. The groupings of the conceptually similar uses can be accounted 
for by means of complex embodied image schemas - an attempt to establish those 
schemas was undertaken in Experiment 1 above. This hypothesis will further be 
tested in Experiment 3 below.
Each set of examples is to be viewed as a category. Consequently, I assume 
that each group will feature central as well as peripheral members. Furthermore, I 
am of the opinion that the three groups of the uses of in are interconnected by 
means of family resemblances based on the links between the six image schemas 
(Section 3.4.2.1). I also maintain that the three categories of senses are subsumed 
under a more abstract CONTAINER schema (Section 4.3.4).
Group One contains the largest number of uses (32), which feature a great 
number of predominantly spatial configurations, among which the central ones 
can be recognised. These are:
1. The brain is in the head.
2. He is in the bedroom.
3. The paint is in the jar.
4. The squirrel is in the tree.
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All twelve subjects classified those instances as members of Group One.
Group One shows a clear category structure. Ratings of the appropriateness of 
examples decrease from the centre (prototype) to reach the periphery of the 
category. The non-central members are:
27. Get in the car.
28 .1 got stuck in the traffic jam.
29. My foot is in the stirrup.
30. Put the butter in the fridge.
31. There is a stone in my hand.
32. He was standing in the doorway.
The marginal members of the category (Group One) were classified as good 
representatives of the set by only five subjects. The most marginal members of 
Group One are assumed to show a certain degree of overlap with members of the 
other two groups. In other words, I assume that their image-schematic profiles will 
overlap with the schemas for PATH and/or PART-WHOLE (Section 3.4.2.1).
Group One is assumed to feature the most configurationally varied and thus 
metaphorically productive set of uses. The configurational variation is assumed to 
concern instances of the same image schemas, which makes Group One the most 
central of the three (Section 4.3.6).
Group Two is composed of ten instances. The distinction between central and 
peripheral uses is blurred. The best example(s) scored 4 points while the poorest 
obtained 2 points. In other words, Group Two does not show a clear category 
structure. It is difficult to find the central (prototypical) member of this category. 
What can be thus inferred is that Group Two may not constitute an independent 
sense. Rather, it should be viewed as a transition group between Group One and 
Group Three. In other words, members of Group Two are non-central members of 
either Group One or Group Three. The existence of such a transition group is 
motivated by the continuum along which the image schemas underlying the 
conceptualisation of in are structured (Experiment One). Alternately, we can 
assume that there exist prototypical instances of Group Two which have been 
classified as peripheral members of one of the other two groups. The results of 
Experiment 3 below suggest that the latter is more plausible (Section 3.4.4.1).
Group Three contains 14 examples. The group shows a clear a category 
structure.
The best examples are:
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1. He spoke in Russian.
2. He is doing a degree in philosophy.
3. Dinner will be ready in ten minutes.
Their level of appropriateness is 10 points.
The peripheral examples are:
13. Slice the potatoes in two.
14. One in ten people had problems with reading.
They were classified as good examples of the group by four subjects. 
Consequently, they are likely to show featural overlap with the other two groups.
Group Three includes examples which seem to be the most unrelated. Thus, it 
is my tentative hypothesis that Group Three could be further divided to reveal the 
distinct image schemas for PATH and FORCE (Section 3.4.4.1).
3.4.4 Experiment Three
Table 5 below presents the sets of in examples distinguished on the basis of 
individual image-schematic profiles. Group headings were chosen on the basis of 
the prevailing image schema. The numbers placed next to each example indicate 
the frequency of co-occurrence of a particular example and a given image schema. 
Image schemas of secondary importance for a particular item are 
placed in brackets, along with the frequency of their occurrence.
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IMAGE SCHEMA 
CONTAINER
EXAMPLES
1. He is in the bedroom. 10
2. The circle is drawn in a triangle. 10
3. The paint is in the jar. 10
4. There are toys in the window. 10
5. The brain is in the head. 10
6. W e are in Scotland. (SUPPORT 2) 10
7. He is in bed. (SUPPORT 3) 9
8. The magazine is in the rack. 
(SUPPORT 3) 8
9. They live in the middle o f the 
wood. 8
10. There is a stone in my hand. 8
11. Put the butter in the fridge.
(PATH 4) 7
12. The nails are in the board. 
(PART-WHOLE 4) 7
13. The camel is in the desert.
(PART-WHOLE 3) 7
14. He was standing in the doorway. 7
15. Fish swim in the water. 7
1 6 . 1 have got something in my eye. 
(CONSTRAINT 5) 6
17. She has got a child in her arms. 
(SUPPORT5) 6
18. My foot is in the stirrup. 
(FULL-EMPTY 2) 6
19. There is a hole in the road. 
(FULL-EMPTY 3) 6
20. Who is the woman in that painting? 
(PART-WHOLE 5) 5
21. Do you recognise that man in jeans? 
(PART-WHOLE 5) 5
22. Jersey is in the English Channel. 
(PART-WHOLE 2) 5
23. He lives in our neighbourhood. 
(PART-WHOLE 3) 5
24. There is a wardrobe in the corner. 5
25. The snake is in the grass. 5
26. The squirrel is in the tree. 
(MERGING 3) 5
27. The socket is in the wall.
(PART-WHOLE 3) 5
28. Have you ever been in love? 
(CONSTRAINT 4) 4
29. Your car is in very good condition. 
(FULL-EMPTY 2) 2
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PART-W H O LE I. One in ten people had 
problems with reading. 10
2 . 1 have been waiting in this 
queue for ages. (CONTAINER  
4 )8
3. She is in the news. 
(CONTAINER 5) 7
4. There is a gold thread in the 
carpet. (CONTAINER 4) 7
5. He is deaf in one ear. 
(CONTAINER 6) 7
6. She takes milk in her coffee. 
(CONTAINER 3) 7
7. The gold is in the ore. 
(CONTAINER 3) 6
8. There is a curve in the road. 6
9. He was shot in the head. 
(PATH 3) 6
10. He has got a ring in his 
ear. 6
II . Slice the potatoes in two. 5 
12. The kettle hangs in the fire. 
(CONTAINER 3) 3
FORCE:
CONSTRAINT
1 .1 got stuck in a traffic jam. 
(CONTAINER 6) 9
2. In refusing to go abroad, he 
missed his chance. 7
3. He refused to say anything in 
reply to the question. 6
4. There is a pain in my back. 6
5. W e watched the scene in 
horror. 5
6. The sun is in my face. 
(MERGING 4) 3
M ERG ING 1. The monument is in granite. 
(FULL-EMPTY 4) 9
FULL-EM PTY 1. The house is in ruins. 9 
(PATH 2)
PATH 1 .Get in the car. 
(CONTAINER 8) 10
2. He is doing a degree in 
philosophy. 9
3. Mary is in her twenties. 
(CONTAINER 4) 7
4. Dinner will be ready in ten 
minutes. 7
5. W e are leaving in April. 6
6. The dip in the graph is very 
significant.
(PART-WHOLE 2) 5
7. He spoke in Russian. 
(CONTAINER 3) 4
Table 5. Groups of in examples established on the basis of 
image-schematic profiles
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3.4.4.1 Results and Discussion
Subjects considered it a meaningful task to represent their meaning intuitions 
of the 56 in examples in terms of image schemas. In other words, their judgements 
may attest to the fact that there exists an underlying image-schematic structure 
giving coherence to our experience at the preconceptual level, which is in turn 
manifested by the conceptual structure of the category. Consequently, the image- 
schematic profiles obtained in Experiment 3 for the 56 uses of in may well 
indicate what preconceptual information is present in the semantic structure of the 
preposition in.
On the basis of the results of Experiment 3, it appears that six image schemas, 
CONTAINER, PART-WHOLE, MERGING, CONSTRAINT, PATH and FULL- 
EMPTY, were attributed enough salience by the subjects to be rendered the 
determinants of groups of senses. In comparison with Experiments 1 and 2 above, 
a few interesting points can be observed.
Out of the schemas for FORCE, the CONSTRAINT schema seems to be the 
most salient. The category includes six examples and features a clear prototype:
1 .1 got stuck in a traffic jam.
The schema for SUPPORT was not found salient enough to underlie a separate 
category of uses the schema was typically viewed as one of the dimensions of the 
CONTAINER schema (examples: 6, 7, 8,17).
The schema for PRESSURE did not occur among the results of Experiment 3.
The FULL-EMPTY schema, which was not enumerated among the five 
schemas relevant to the preconceptual experience of in in Experiment 1, was 
evaluated as a determinant of an image-schematic profile.
The MERGING schema, as well as the FULL-EMPTY schema, form, 
according to the results of Experiment 3, categories which include only one 
example each. The schemas might underlie separate categories of senses provided 
the number of in instances included in the experiment was larger. Alternatively, 
they can be viewed as subschemas of other categories based on complex 
experiential gestalts (CONTAINER for the FULL-EMPTY schema, and PART- 
WHOLE for the MERGING schema). I assume that it is more linguistically 
economical to adopt the latter interpretation (Section 4.3.4).
Below, I discuss how the image-schematic profiles established for each of the 
uses of in in Experiment 3 predict group membership in Experiment 2.
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3.4.4.1.1 CONTAINER
The first group of uses motivated by the CONTAINER schema is the most 
numerous and varied. It includes 29 examples which refer to both spatial and 
abstract domains. The category is centred around the most prototypical examples 
(1-6). Peripheral members of the category are assumed to show a considerable 
featural overlap with members of neighbouring categories (PART-WHOLE, 
FORCE, PATH).
Eleven examples are defined by the CONTAINER schema only. Moreover, 
those instances are very good members of the category (four of them belong to the 
prototypical set). Consequently, I suggest the dominant role of the CONTAINER 
schema in underlying the category structure of in.2*
Less prototypical members of the category defined by the CONTAINER 
schema feature more overlap with other schemas. These are: PART-WHOLE (7), 
SUPPORT (4), FULL-EMPTY (3), CONSTRAINT (2), PATH (1) and 
MERGING (1).
The co-occurrence of the CONTAINER schema with the six schemas 
enumerated above is motivated by experiential links perceived among image 
schemas and discussed in Section 3.4.2.1. Those links may well determine image- 
schematic transformations, sense connections, and metaphoric extensions (Section 
4.2).
28 out of the 32 members of Group One, Experiment 2, can be predicted on the 
basis of image-schematic profiles established in Experiment 3. The exceptions 
are:
1. Fish swim in the water.
2. Who is the woman in that painting?
3. Do you recognise that man in jeans?
4. Your car is in very good condition.
Examples 1-4 above were motivated by the CONTAINER schema in 
Experiment 3. In Experiment 2, however, Examples 1-3 were classified as 
members of Group Two, Example 4 as an instantiation of Group Three. My 
suggestion for Experiment 2, Group Two was that this category, being not a very 
clearly delineated one, was likely to include peripheral members of Groups One 
and Three. Consequently, the relation between Group Two, Experiment 2 and the 
CONTAINER schema motivating membership in the first group of Experiment 3
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can be suggested. The relation is reinforced by experiential co-relations between 
image schemas (Section 3.4.2.1).
There is an interesting correspondence between the most prototypical members 
of Group One, Experiment 2, and the group currently discussed in Experiment 3. 
The following examples were rendered the most central in both groups:
1. The brain is in the head.
2. He is in the bedroom.
3. The paint is in the jar.
Thus, it might be suggested that the three examples above form the prototype 
of the category in (Section 4.3.6.2.3).
3.4.4.1.2 PART-WHOLE
The second group distinguished in Experiment 3 is motivated by the PART- 
WHOLE schema. The image-schematic profiles attributed to each of the uses of in 
in the PART-WHOLE group can predict the membership in Group Two, 
Experiment 2 for six out of the ten members. This lower rate of predictability 
shows that the PART-WHOLE schema is less prototypical for the category 
structure of in than the CONTAINER schema.
The PART-WHOLE group of Experiment 3 features a clear category structure 
with distinct prototypical members:
1. One in ten people had problems with reading.
2. I have been waiting in this queue for ages.
Example 1 was placed at the periphery of Group Three, Experiment 2. Since 
peripheral members of one category are likely to overlap with members of other 
categories, it may be assumed that Example 1 above is the prototype of the PART- 
WHOLE group rather than a marginal member of the third group in Experiment 2 
(Section 3.4.3.1). In this, more consistency is given to the PART-WHOLE group 
by providing the category with a clear prototype. At the same time, a better 
structure is given to Group Three, Experiment 3 in reducing the number of image 
schemas underlying the uses of in comprised by this category.
Example 2 above has been classified as a prototypical member of Group One, 
Experiment Two.
The PART-WHOLE schema is likely to motivate a distinct sense of the 
preposition in. Although the category is linked to that of the CONTAINER
28 None o f the other schemas (PART-WHOLE, PATH, and FORCE) was found to be the sole
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schema (Section 3.4.2.1), it may well feature some overlap with the structure of 
other prepositions (Section 4.3.7).
3.4.4.1.3 MERGING and FULL-EMPTY
The MERGING schema underlying the meaning of:
1. The monument is in granite.
constitutes a separate category according to the subjects participating in 
Experiment 3. It is my assumption, though, that such a limited number of 
examples (1) is not likely to constitute a separate category. Rather, the MERGING 
schema should be placed on the continuum along with such relations as: 
SEPARATION, CONTAINMENT, and PART-WHOLE.
A similar conclusion can be drawn in the case of the FULL-EMPTY schema, 
which appears to motivate another one-member category:
1. The house is in ruins.
Although the FULL-EMPTY schema is relevant to the semantic structure of in, 
in being closely linked to the CONTAINER schema as well as motivating 
metaphorical extensions, I do not assume that it is salient enough to form a 
separate sense of the preposition (Section 3.4.4.1).
3.4.4.1.4 FORCE
Group Three is motivated by the FORCE schema. The CONSTRAINT gestalt 
dominates in all the six uses of in included in the category. The category manifests 
a clear internal structure, with one prototypical example:
1 .1 got stuck in a traffic jam.
In Section 3.4.2.1, the importance of the FORCE schema for the relation of 
CONTAINMENT was recognised.
Johnson (1987) describes the CONTAINER schema in terms of forces acting 
upon and inside the container (Section 3.3.4). Thus, I suggest that the 
CONSTRAINT schema be considered a prominent part of the CONTAINER 
gestalt rather than a separate category of the uses of in (Section 4.2.3.2.1).
3.4.4.1.5 PATH
The PATH schema underlies a category of seven uses of in. It features a clear 
prototype:
determinant of the image-schematic profile o f more than one prototypical example o f the category.
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1. Get in the car.
The category structure is well-delineated, with a range of ratings from 10 to 4.
I assume that the PATH schema motivates a separate sense category of the 
preposition in. In other words, it features only some of the parameters of the 
CONTAINER gestalt (Section 4.3.4). Though experientially linked to the 
CONTAINER schema, the category may manifest a featural overlap with the 
structure of other prepositions (Section 4.3.8).
Image-schematic profiles for members of the two groups, FORCE and PATH, 
predict 11 out of the 16 uses in Group Three, Experiment 2.
On the whole, image-schematic profiles obtained in Experiment 3 for the 56 
uses of the preposition in correctly predicted membership in the three groups of in 
uses in Experiment 2 in 44 out of the 56 cases.
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3.4.5 Conclusions to experimental work
The theory of image schemas, presented in Section 3.2, provides a reliable 
means of accounting for the nature of polysemous items.
The results of the three experiments above suggest that image schemas give 
coherence to all human experience. Image-schematic structures underlie the 
experience of the relation in and image-schematic profiles may well predict 
groupings of examples in such a way as to form a category structure of the 
preposition in. Thus, image schemas are present at the preconceptual as well as 
semantic level of the description of in.
The structure of the category in seems to be motivated by the following image 
schemas: CONTAINER, PART-WHOLE, MERGING, PRESSURE, 
CONSTRAINT and PATH
(Experiment 1). With the exception of the FULL-EMPTY schema, the image 
schemas applied by subjects in Experiment 3 were consistent with those obtained 
in Experiment 1.
The CONTAINER schema appears the most central among the three categories 
of senses constituting the meaning structure of in. The following results are of 
special importance:
- in Experiment 2 as well as Experiment 3, the groups of senses motivated by the 
CONTAINER schema are the largest and most configurationally varied. Thus, the 
CONTAINER schema may be assumed to be the most linguistically productive 
for concrete as well as abstract senses of in;
- both experiments demonstrate that the CONTAINER schema is the most 
salient as it alone underlies over 30% of all the uses of in in the first group of 
Experiment 3, four of which are prototypical examples. The role of the 
CONTAINER schema for the category structure of in was also confirmed by the 
results of Experiment 1 above.
The experiential gestalt for CONTAINER shows an overlap with six image 
schemas relevant to the understanding of in, which further confirms the central 
role of the CONTAINER schema for the meaning of in Section 3.4.2.1). The 
centrality of CONTAINMENT should be viewed at the superordinate as well as 
basic level of categorisation.29
29 In other words, I suggest that the superordinate schema for CONTAINMENT subsume the three 
presumed senses o f in. At the basic level o f categorisation, the schema for CONTAINER will co ­
exist with the schemas for PART-WHOLE and PATH.
There are relations between schemas that allow us to view some of them along 
a continuum (CONTAINER, PART-WHOLE, MERGING) or as dimensions of 
complex gestalts (Section 3.4.2.1). Those relations may motivate metaphorical 
and metonymic meaning extensions.
The relations among the 56 uses of in emerging as a result of Experiment 3 
form the basis of the category structure of the preposition in discussed in detail in 
Chapter Four.
3.5 Summary of Chapter Three
The purpose of Chapter Three was to experimentally investigate and describe 
the principles according to which different uses of the polysemous spatial 
preposition in are related to each other. The main conclusion from the 
experimental work is that people tacitly recognise some connection between 
schematic bodily experiences and different aspects of linguistic meaning, 
including meanings that are highly abstract. This work obtained evidence that may 
support the image-schematic approach to polysemy (Section 3.2).
According to this approach, different uses of an individual polysemous word are 
related on the basis of the embodied image schemas and different types of 
cognitive links, including image-schematic transformations, metonymic relations, 
and image-schematic metaphorical instantiations.
My hypothesis was that four major embodied image schemas relevant to the 
bodily experience of in, CONTAINER, PART-WHOLE, FORCE and PATH, 
could significantly account for the relations between different senses of in. The 
results of the experiments supported this hypothesis. It was found that 
membership in the groupings of conceptually similar senses of in could be reliably 
predicted on the basis of the image-schematic profiles of those senses, 
independently obtained in another experiment.
The experimental evidence supported the complex image-schematic approach 
to the polysemy of in. The participants had clear intuitions about the relative 
importance of different image schemas to the senses of in. Based on the 
participants' judgements, different senses of in acquired different complex image- 
schematic profiles. For example, the image schema of CONTAINER was judged 
to be the most important in the image-schematic profile o f :
1. He is in the bedroom.
2. The paint is in the jar.
3. The brain is in the head.
PATH was rated as the most important schema in the image-schematic profile
of:
1. Get in the car.
Overall results suggest that an adequate account of polysemy requires 
embodied image schemas that are rooted in people's force experiences and 
perceptual interactions in the world (Section 3.4.4.1.4).
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One of the important properties of an image schema is that it can be 
metaphorically instantiated in different domains (Section 3.2.4). According to the 
Invariance Hypothesis, the metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive 
topology (that is, the image-schematic structure) of the source domain (Lakoff 
1990:54). The experimental results seem to have supported the Hypothesis. For 
example, the image schema CONTAINER was judged to be the dominant image 
schema for such different physical and metaphorical senses of in as The paint is in 
the jar, Have you ever been in love ?, Your car is in very good condition. The 
schema for FORCE may well underlie the preposition in The sun is in my face and 
In refusing to go abroad, he missed his chance.
The fact that in one experiment those different senses of in acquired similar 
image-schematic profiles with CONTAINER and FORCE respectively being a 
dominant image schema, while in another independent experiment those senses 
were judged to be conceptually similar to one another, suggests that those senses 
are related on the basis of the same image schemas in different domains.
It is important to note that image schemas motivate rather than predict sense 
extensions in the polysemous words (Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). 
They do not strictly determine sense extensions. However, this does not mean that 
the sense extensions are arbitrary. The motivated sense extensions are constrained 
by the embodied image-schematic knowledge and by the types of cognitive links 
relating different senses, including image-schematic transformations, metonymic 
extensions, and metaphorical instantiations of image schemas in different domains 
(Section 3.2).
Image schemas are not necessarily semantic representations. Being embodied 
preconceptual meaning structures, they are not necessarily consciously represented 
or activated during on-line language processing. Even though they motivate 
various abstract concepts, they themselves are not necessarily semantic 
representations of those concepts.30 It is in Chapter Four of the thesis that I 
investigate the nature of correspondences between preconceptual and semantic 
structures.31
Chapter Three of the thesis contains the empirical evidence in support of the 
image-schematic motivation of polysemy. In this, it is consistent with Lakoff s
30In other words, I am assuming that experience is mapped onto a representation system through 
which we can manipulate, categorise and understand it.
31 In other words, I will investigate which elements of image schemas are mapped onto the 
conceptual structure o f the preposition in.
(1990) “cognitive commitment”, which emphasises the importance of 
incorporating data from various related disciplines such as Psycholinguistics, 
Cognitive and Developmental Psychology for our understanding of language, and 
the importance of the empirical evidence for the linguistic constructs. Lakoff s 
notion stresses the importance of the conceptual and experiential basis of 
linguistic categories and suggests that the formal structures of language be studied 
not as if they were autonomous, but as reflections of general conceptual 
organisation, categorisation principles, and processing mechanisms.
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4. C H A P T E R  F O U R
A Cognitive-Semantic Analysis of the English
Preposition in:
Part Two
4.1 Orientation
Chapter Four presents the second part of the semantic analysis of the English 
preposition in. Section 4.2 introduces the descriptive tools employed in the 
analysis. Emphasis is laid upon configurational and relational properties of the 
arguments. In Section 4.3, the category structure of the preposition in is discussed. 
In Section 4.3.5, conceptual metaphors motivating the abstract senses of in are 
presented. The category structure, featuring the three senses of the prepositional 
predicate in motivated by image schemas for CONTAINER (IN-1), PART- 
WHOLE (IN-2) and PATH (IN-3) which emerged from the three experiments in 
Chapter Three (Section 3.4.5), is presented in Sections 4.3.6-4.3.8. Section 4.4 
presents conclusions to Chapter Four.
4.2 Descriptive tools
4.2.1 Introduction
In Section 4.2.2, I will discuss the trajector-landmark organisation of the 
prepositional predicate. Configurational, functional and relational features of the 
arguments will be presented in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.2 The fifth dimension of mental imagery: designation and trajector- 
landmark organisation
In Cognitive Semantics, grammar is regarded as part of human knowledge 
allowing a speaker to manipulate specific sets of symbols, basically audio-oral in 
nature, for the purposes of inter-personal communication (Hawkins 1985). The 
creative aspects of language are attributed not to the grammar itself but to the
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human being. The use of language is thus a problem-solving task for which we 
depend upon the knowledge of grammar.
Grammar is not seen as a self-contained generative system but as a structured 
inventory of conventional linguistic units. The inventory is structured and thus 
manageable by means of symbolisation, schematicity, prototypicality and 
integration (Hawkins 1985).
A unit is a specific type of knowledge structure whose internal construction 
does not have to be attended to and the manipulation of which is thus automatic. 
The central feature of human language is that it is symbolic in nature (Langacker 
1987). Linguistic units can be of three types: phonological, semantic, and 
symbolic. The minimal symbolic unit is a morpheme, where no subpart of the one 
pole stands in direct symbolic relation with any subpart of the other. Semantic 
units are conceptual units which have gained special status within the language 
system.32 The minimal semantic unit in a symbolic relation is a predicate 
(Langacker 1987: 43).
A predication is made relative to one or more cognitive domains. The 
collection of domains activated by a predication is called its matrix. A distinction 
can be made between basic and abstract domains:
“ I will refer to a primitive representational field of this sort as a basic domain. A 
fair number of distinct basic domains must be posited on the grounds that they 
cannot be fully reduced to another, though they are certainly not unrelated and 
we are hardly in a position at present to achieve a definite list or description of 
their interconnections.” (Langacker 1987: 56)
All non-basic domains are abstract. Abstract domains are higher-order 
conceptual complexes, indirectly grounded in basic domains:
“Any concept or conceptual complex that functions as a domain for the 
definition of a higher-order concept, will be called an abstract domain.” 
(Langacker 1987: 57)
The concept behind “abstract domain” is not new:
32 Semantic structures are internal representations which have been conventionalised for purposes 
of linguistic symbolisation. Thus, as conventionalisation is a function o f a given population, 
semantic structures are not universal. Linguistic relativity (or the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis) is 
manifested through various systems o f conceptual metaphors that different communities have to 
conceive o f the same abstract concepts. In western culture, for instance, time is a valuable resource 
{TIME IS MONEY, L E T S  NOT WASTE ANY TIME) (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).
“An abstract domain is essentially equivalent to what Lakoff (1987) terms an 
ICM (for idealised cognitive model) and what others have variously called a 
frame, scene, schema, or even script.” (Langacker 1987: 61)
Those portions of a domain (or matrix) that are directly relevant for a particular 
predication constitute its base. Within this base, some entities are considered as 
more salient or prominent than others. These will stand out as a profile. The 
profile is thus a substructure that has been raised to a special level of prominence. 
Imposing a particular profile on a base is called a designation, the relation that 
holds internally to a semantic structure.
In turn, a profile is organised in terms of figure and ground. The figure is called 
the trajector (TR) and the entities constituting the ground are called landmarks 
(LM).
Designation and trajector-landmark organisation make up the fifth dimension 
of imagery.
“ Finally, predications invoking the same content can be distinguished by the 
relative prominence accorded various substructures. [...] First, within the base 
provided by the content that falls within its scope, every predication profiles (i.e. 
designates) some entity. [...] Second, expressions that designate relationships 
accord varying degrees of prominence to the relational participants. In particular, 
one participant - termed the trajector - stands out as the figure within the profiled 
relationship.” (Langacker 1991: 4)
For example, in in I have got something in my eye profiles a relation between 
the trajector (something) and the landmark (my eye). The relation is profiled 
against the domain of oriented physical space. The human body is a part of the 
domain, thus it constitutes the base in the designated relation.
Prepositional predicates profile static relations, with configurational as well as 
relational information reflected in the structure ascribed to them. Configurational 
information is elaborated by geometrical as well as functional properties of the 
arguments. The relational structure is determined by Force Dynamics (Section
4.2.3.2.1).
4.2.3 Configurational and relational properties of prepositional predicates
A spatial preposition typically locates a trajector relative to a landmark in the 
domain of oriented physical space. The LM serves as a reference point. In order to 
qualify as a prototypical in relation, the TR has to be located in a fairly confined 
area inside the LM. This area is called a search domain:
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“ The search domain is defined as the region to which a locative expression 
confines its trajector [...]. Observe that a phrase like ‘under the bed (is all dusty)’ 
is construed as naming a spatial region - a type of ‘thing’ - rather than a 
relationship (a relationship per se can hardly be dusty). Our ability to conceptually 
reify and refer to the search domain argues strongly for the psychological validity 
of this notion.” (Langacker 1993:16)
The notion of the search domain is synonymous to that of an active zone. An 
active zone is a significant part of the profile of the elaborating structure. The 
significance of an active zone can be illustrated by the two possible interpretations 
of the predicate in The nails are in the box. One of them involves the interior of 
the box, the other its outer surface. Henceforth, the traj ector and the landmark will 
stand for their respective active zones participating in the relation (Section 2.2.6).
It is assumed that a semantic analysis must capture the content common to any 
observed semantic natural class (Hawkins 1985). There are two prominent 
semantic classes pertaining to prepositional predicates, configurations of the LM 
and the TR, and relations between the two profiled entities. Configurational 
properties of the arguments (i.e. the trajector and the landmark) will be discussed 
first.
4.2.3.1 Configurational properties of trajector and landmark entities
4.2.3.1.1 Traj ector configurations
Hawkins (1985) proposes an inventory of nine spatial configurations for 
trajector entities (path [terminative. initiative, perfective, imperfective. circuitive. 
non-rectilinear]. area, space, indeterminate) which are distinguished on the basis of 
topological and geometric properties.
' Four trajector configurations will be relevant to the current study. The 
terminative path, indeterminate and space configurations have been introduced by 
Hawkins (1985). Lindner (1982) identified reflexive traj ectors, which profile only 
one entity in the relation. For example, in The syrip spread out, the traj ector is its 
own landmark which is moving relative to its own prior boundary (Lakoff 1987). 
In The house is in ruins, the trajector is the initial state of the metaphorically 
construed process whose result is the landmark.33 In other words, the two 
arguments refer to one entity which has undergone a process of deterioration
33 The conceptual metaphor motivating the relation is PROCESSES ARE PA THS (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980). All metaphors used in the analysis arc presented in Section 4.3.5.2.
conceptualised along the up-down terminative path. The four configurations are 
discussed below.
1. The terminative path
It is a spatial configuration with significant extension in a single dimension. The 
terminus of the path is salient, as in Put the butter in the fridge. The terminative 
path configuration will also be used for predicates which designate a metaphorical 
PATH (.Dinner will be ready in ten minutes)
2. Indeterminate
It is a spatial configuration which fails to have significant extension in any 
dimension. Consequently, there is absence of any configurational information (He 
is in bed). The indeterminate configuration will be most frequently manifested by 
the trajectors in Sections 4.3.6- 4.3.8 below.
3. Space
It is a spatial configuration with significant extension in all three dimensions. In 
There is paint in the jar, the trajector is lexicalised by a mass noun extended in a 
three-dimensional container. In Section 4.3.6 below, I will suggest that the space 
configuration of the trajector is manifested by the most prototypical instances of 
in.
4. Reflexive
The reflexive trajector configuration is superordinate in comprising the 
terminative path, space and indeterminate configurations. In The house is in ruins, 
the initial configuration of the TR/LM entity is space. The process of its 
deterioration is conceptualised metaphorically as a terminative path along the up- 
down axis. The final configuration of the TR/LM entity is indeterminate (Section
4.3.6.3.4).
4.2.3.1.2 Landmark configurations
Landmark configurations are differentiated with respect to specific relational 
potential of the configuration. Hawkins (1985) distinguishes four spatial 
configurations for landmark entities (medium, surface, channel, indeterminate). 
The LM configuration medium may give rise to the relation of CONTAINMENT. 
Thus, it is relevant to the present analysis.
Hawkins (1985: 95) defines MEDIUM as
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“[...] something that encompasses or envelops other things; a condition, 
atmosphere, or environment in which something may function or flourish 
(Webster’sNew World Dictionary).”
The medium landmark reflects its potential to bear the relation of inclusion or 
containment to other entities. Mediums are discerned with reference to 
dimensionality, porosity and boundedness34
To sum up, I suggest that the trajector and landmark configurations discussed 
above constitute e-sites for the entities elaborating them. Hawkins defines an e-site 
as
“[...] a schematic configurational content in the profile which provides an 
environment for elaboration by an adjoining semantic structure.”
(Hawkins 1985: 143)
Those schemas for the relevant active zones of the arguments are elaborated by 
geometric idealisations and functional properties.
4.2.3.1.3 Geometric descriptions
In Section 2.2.4 of the thesis, I emphasised the distinction between the obj ective 
reality and our conceptualisations of objects and relations. The referring function 
of language is highlighted by prepositional predicates since they denote our 
conceptualisations, or geometric descriptions, of obj ects which apply to various 
geometric figures (points, surfaces, volumes) associated with the obj ect (Herskovits 
1986). Moreover, the same object may be conceptualised in different ways 
according to the perspective from which the scene is considered (Section 2.2.5).
“An important part of the discrepancies between the definition of the preposition 
and the scenes these prepositions describe may be explained by the geometric 
description of the objects.” (Vandeloise 1984:177)
Geometric idealisations relevant to our conceptualisation of the active zones of 
the arguments profiled by the prepositional predicate in are presented below. First, 
geometric descriptions of the four traj ector configurations are presented.
34 Types of medium will be discussed in Section 4.2.3.1.3.2 below.
4.2.3.1.3.1 Geometric descriptions of trajector configurations
In Section 4.2.3.1.1, I distinguished four trajector configurations. The 
indeterminate configuration is idealised to a point. The profiled part of the 
terminative path configuration, the terminus, is also a point-like entity. The space 
configuration is elaborated by volumes (liquids or masses). In the reflexive 
trajector configuration, the initial TR/LM entity is idealised to a volume.35 The 
final configuration is conceptualised as a point.
4.2.3.1.3.2 Geometric descriptions of the landmark configuration
The landmark configuration medium can give rise to the relation of 
CONTAINMENT, which defines the prepositional predicate in (Section
4.2.3.1.2).
Cuyckens (1993) distinguishes three features along which the active zones 
labelled mediums can be defined. Those are dimensionality, porosity and 
boundedness. Thus, mediums can be 3 DIM (e.g. jar), 2DIM (e.g. desert), 1DIM 
(e.g. line) and ODIM (e.g. point). They can be porous (room) or non-porous (wall). 
Bounded mediums profile both an enveloping environment and its definite 
boundaries (jar). Non-bounded mediums are active zones featuring free outward 
surfaces, some of whose boundaries are vague (water).
I suggest that 3DIM, porous, bounded mediums should be further distinguished 
on the basis of the direction of the trajector’s (potential) movement preceding the 
relation.36 Consequently, the trajector’s (potential) movement along the front-back 
axis will precede the relation with channel landmarks. The movement along the 
up-down axis will characterise cylinder landmarks.37
The direction of the trajector’s potential movement usually coincides with the 
orientation of the landmark determined by the position of its opening (Section
2.2.5). For instance, in The paint is in the jar, the predicate profiles a 3DIM, 
porous, bounded medium classified as a cylinder due to both the direction of the 
trajector’s movement and the position of the opening. In He is in the bedroom, the 
medium is a 3DIM, porous , bounded active zone labelled “channel” as the 
position of the opening as well as the direction of the trajector’s movement
35 The geometric idealisation to a volume is justified by the prominence o f the FULL-EMPTY  
schema in the base (Section 4.3.6.2.1).
36 The importance o f the notion o f potential movement for the relation of CONTAINMENT has 
been recognised by Vandeloise (1991).
37 In other words, a channel landmark is a rotated cylinder landmark 
(Lakoff 1987).
impose a front-back orientation on the landmark. If a medium features no obvious 
opening (comer, middle), the direction of movement will serve as a determinant.38 
I suggest that the notion of potential movement should be regarded as an 
illustration of the first type of subjectification (Section 2.2.5).
Below, I discuss seven types of medium which are relevant to the current 
study. The descriptions refer to the active zones of the referent objects functioning 
as mediums (Section 4.2.3).
1. 3DIM, porous, bounded, cylinder, mediums are elaborated by
“[...] shells [...] with a solid external boundary circumscribing a three- 
dimensional interior with a consistency quite different from the boundary.” 
(Hawkins 1985: 253)
“As complete closure is relatively rare [...] some boundaries of the interior will 
usually be imaginary.” (Herskovits 1986: 150)
Consequently, the active zone will be instantiated here by (fully or partially 
surrounded) cup-like concavities (head, jar, eye, bed, rack) or spaces delimited by 
imaginary planes (trousers, arms, hand).
2. 3DIM, porous, bounded, channel mediums can be elaborated by (completely or 
partially) delimited box-like entities (room, car, fridge), spaces bounded by 
imaginary planes (comer, middle, stirrup) including openings (window, 
doorway).
3. 3DIM, non-porous, bounded mediums are elaborated by entities conceptualised 
as laminas (There is a hole in the road)39, groups of solid objects (grass, queue) or 
volumes (coffee, wall).
4. 3DIM, non-porous, non-bounded mediums are elaborated here by volumes 
(water).
5. 2DIM, bounded mediums are geometrically described as planes (Scotland, 
desert).
6. IDEM mediums are elaborated by lines (graph);
7. ODIM mediums are elaborated by points (The sun is in my face).
In Section 4.3.6.3.2, I will argue that 3DIM, porous, bounded, cylinder 
landmarks are the most prototypical for the relation of CONTAINMENT.
38 Boers (1994:45) claims that “the recognition o f a distinct schema is motivated by the occurrence 
o f figurative extensions from precisely such a schema”. In Section 4 .3 .6 ,1 will try to demonstrate 
that the distinction into cylinder and channel landmarks is borne out by the Invariance Hypothesis 
(Lakoff 1990; Turner 1993).
39 Full sentences are quoted to avoid ambiguity when alternative conceptualisations are possible.
4.2.3.1.3 Functional properties of the trajector and the landmark
Vandeloise (1991) points out that geometrical and topological properties of 
arguments result from their functional properties. There is only one functional 
property of the trajector which is relevant for the relation of CONTAINMENT; 
namely, the trajector should have the potential to fill the container landmark. In 
The paint is in the jar, the potential is realised by the space trajector whose 
geometric description is that of a volume (Section 4.2.3.1.3.1).
The landmark manifests six functional properties. The asymmetry can be 
explained by the landmark’s prominence for prepositional predicates:
“ In the static relations, the landmark tends to be important as it functions as a 
reference point. As a result, the LM configuration tends to be overtly 
elaborated.”(Boers 1994: 45)
The six functional characteristics of mediums are presented below:40
1. containers can carry things (hand, arms);
2. or store them (jar, room);
3. they hide objects (head, trousers);
4. or display them (window);41
5. containers protect the contained object (arms, head);
6. they can be filled (jar, eye, rack) 42
The relevance of those functional properties will be justified, in consonance 
with the Invariance Hypothesis, by the analysis of the metaphorical extensions of 
the preposition.
4.2.3.2 Relational properties of the predicate in
In Section 4.2.3, I pointed out that a semantic analysis of a prepositional 
predicate should account for configurational and relational features of the 
arguments.
Hawkins (1985) postulates two basic relations valid for prepositional 
predicates. These are COINCIDENCE, where the place of the trajector (or one of 
its parts) coincides with the place of the landmark (or one of its parts) and 
SEPARATION, where no part of the trajector coincides with the place of any part
40 See Section 3.3.4.
41 In Section 4 .3 .4 ,1 will suggest that prototypical relations o f CONTAINMENT do not profile 
landmarks manifesting that functional property.
42 That functional property is motivated by the FULL-EMPTY image schema (Section 3.4.2). In 
other words, prototypical containers can be filled by space trajectors. The process is oriented along 
the up-down axis.
of the landmark. The English preposition in profiles the relation of 
COINCIDENCE.
I propose that the predicate in profiles a relation of CONTAINMENT. Johnson 
(1987) argues that the CONTAINER schema is dynamic. The container protects 
the contained from outside forces as well as restraining its movements (Section
3.3.4). Vandeloise (1991: 225) states that it is the landmark that controls the 
position of the contained object.
In order to describe the preposition in as a dynamic schema, the concept of 
Force Dynamics in Cognitive Semantics will now be presented.
4.2.3.2.1 Force Dynamics
Force dynamic systems describe the behaviour of physical entities with respect 
to the application of FORCE. Talmy (1988)43 claims that meanings generated by 
the system are represented by various closed-class items.
Force Dynamics is a way of representing how the schematic relationship 
OBJECT AT LOCATION and its derivative MOVEMENT schema are affected 
over time when two objects interact.
While we do not live in a Newtonian world where all motion is relative, we do 
conceptualise a world which is governed by the laws of inertia. Our experience 
tells us that changing a spatial relationship requires energy that is embodied in one 
of the entities in THE CHANGE OF LOCATION schema. The object whose 
movement defines the event is called the agonist and the object that interacts 
contrary to the agonist is the antagonist. Objects, whether agonist or antagonist, 
tend either toward movement or re s t. Whether or not the event takes place or the 
agonist moves is determined by the relative strength of the two entities. The 
steady states can change over time. The agonist can either enter or leave the 
relationship with the antagonist, or the relative strengths of the two objects can 
change.
43 Talmy focuses on the force dynamic analysis o f the meaning o f causatives. Sweetser (1990) 
extends the force dynamic system to describe the meanings o f modals in English.
Talmy's analysis o f causatives and Sweetser's analysis o f modals demonstrate the need for 
attributing FORCE to entities in image schemata because those relationships are preserved 
between source and target domains. These theories show how the entities in image schemata 
interact with respect to FORCE. The addition o f vectors and potential movement add to the 
descriptive power o f the theory in that movements can take different forms.
In the relation of CONTAINMENT, the FORCE of the antagonist (LM) is 
typically greater than that of the agonist (TR). Consequently, the landmark 
controls the position of the trajector and determines its fixed location.
According to Johnson (1987), FORCE is experienced through interaction only 
and is additionally characterised by the following features:
1. the notion of direction (a goal of the movement);
2. the notion of potential movement: FORCE embodied in one of the entities is 
potential and not kinetic (Section 4.2.3.1.3.2).
Summing up, the force dynamic relation manifested by the prepositional 
predicate in is that of CONSTRAINT (Section 3.4.4.1.4). I propose that the 
FORCE gestalt for CONSTRAINT manifests three realisations (Cl, C2, C3). C l 
defines the CONTAINER (Section 3.4.4.1.1), C2 the PART-WHOLE (Section
3.4.4.1.2) and C3 the PATH image schema (Section 3.4.4.1.5). As deixis is a part 
of the structure of the schema (Section 2.2.5), I will adopt the viewpoint of an 
outside observer in my descriptions.44
Each of the schemas is structured as a prototypical category (Section 2.3.6.2).
1. CONSTRAINT ONE (Cl)
The schema defines the relation between the agonist whose potential 
movement precedes the relation and the antagonist. The antagonist keeps the 
agonist within its limits, usually blocking it from the view of the outside observer. 
The CONSTRAINT schema Cl is profiled by the uses of in subsumed under the 
first sense category (IN-1) (Section 4.3.6). Central instantiations of the schema 
{The brain is in the head, He is in the bedroom) are characterised by the agonist’s 
total inclusion within the limits of the antagonist. Less central examples feature 
partial inclusion (The nails are in the board). Peripheral instances {My foot is in 
stirrup, There are toys in the window) show an overlap with the category IN-2 
characterised by the CONSTRAINT schema C2; Slice the potatoes in two shares a 
force dynamic pattern with the CONSTRAINT schema C3.
2. CONSTRAINT TWO (C2)
The CONSTRAINT schema C2 features a relation between an antagonist and 
an agonist in which the (potential) movement of the trajector preceding the 
relation is not prominent (The curve is in the road). Moreover, the experiential
entailments of the CONSTRAINT schema, the invisibility of the trajector and/or 
its inaccessibility to the outside observer, are suspended. In other words, the 
agonist is displayed by the container (Section 4.2.3.1.3). Prototypical examples 
defined by the schema C2 show a featural overlap with members of the IN-1 
schema. Peripheral instances share a number of features with the prepositional 
category of (Section 4.3.7).
3. CONSTRAINT THREE (C3)
The agonist’s mobility is initially unrestricted by the antagonist {Put the butter 
in the fridge). The relation changes once the agonist is included within the 
boundaries of the antagonist. The resulting force dynamic schema is that of C l. 
The image-schematic profile of the category C3 corresponds to that of the 
preposition into (Section 4.3.8).
The definitions of the three realisations of the CONSTRAINT schema 
correspond to those of the image schemas for CONTAINER (Cl), PART- 
WHOLE (C2) and PATH (C3) in Section 3.4.2.1. They share the feature of the 
landmark constraining the trajector but differ with respect to the salience of the 
PATH schema in the base and the prominence of the trajector in the profile. 
Therefore, I suggest that the three types of the CONSTRAINT schema 
distinguished above motivate the polysemy of in at the most abstract level of 
categorisation (Section 4.3.2). I also suggest that the Cl schema defines the 
prototypical in predicates (Section 4.3.6).
4.2.4 Conclusions
In Section 4.2, the descriptive tools to be used in the case study in Section 4.3 
have been discussed. I have argued that a semantic analysis of a prepositional 
predicate should account for configurational, functional and relational 
chracteristies of the trajector and the landmark. Those features should be regarded 
as parameters of an experiential gestalt motivating the meaning of a prepositional 
category.
44 Consequently, my semantic analysis will not include parameters resulting from adopting the
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4.3 The category structure of the preposition in
4.3.1 Introduction
4.3.2 The preposition in as a polyseme
In Section 3.4.5,1 suggested that the preposition in is a polysemous item. The 
definition of polysemy in Cognitive Linguistics refers to particular sets of 
symbolic units within the grammar.45 Thus, two features of any set of symbolic 
units exhibit polysemy; the unit at the phonological pole is identical throughout 
the set. The phenomena at the semantic pole exhibit significant variation.
Each of the symbolic units exhibits a different predicate at its semantic pole. 
The predicates in the set are linked. The most significant aspect of polysemy is the 
variation in the predicates within the set of polysemous symbolic units.
Hawkins (1985) postulates that polysemy should be recognised in any case in 
which a preposition exhibits contrasting predicates (profile/base structures) 
regardless of whether the contrast is attributable to the immediate linguistic 
environment. In other words, polysemy is recognised whenever a given 
preposition exhibits predicates that vary in the configurational and/or relational 
content in the profile. For example, The brain is in the head and Put the butter in 
the fridge are two distinct senses of in with regard to their respective 
configurational contents. The former profiles an indeterminate trajector 
configuration; the latter profiles a TR whose configuration is the terminative path.
Differences in trajector configurations presuppose differences in the respective 
bases of the relations. In Put the butter in the fridge, unlike The brain is in the 
head, the PATH figures prominently in the base.
Polysemy is also recognised when identical structures are profiled against 
contrasting bases. In The brain is in the head, the relation is profiled against the 
base of the human body which is a part of the domain of physical space. In Have 
you ever been in love?, the predicate is profiled against the abstract domain of 
emotions.
In Section 2.4.3.1, I adopted a definition of polysemy as a gradable concept. 
Consequently, I will distinguish between ambiguity and vagueness.
Vagueness will be manifested by predicates subsumed under the same 
subordinate schema. For example, We are in Scotland and He lives in our
other possible vantage point, for example the degree to which the trajector feels restrained.
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neighbourhood both elaborate a schema defined by a 2DIM, bounded landmark, 
an indeterminate trajector and a force dynamic relation of CONSTRAINT (Cl). 
The two predicates differ only with respect to the geometric idealisation of their 
landmarks. Ambiguity will be manifested by examples subsumed under different 
schemas.
Consequently, I will recognise polysemy at different levels of abstraction. In 
He is in the bedroom, the predicate instantiates a schema defined by a 3DIM, 
porous, bounded, channel LM and an indeterminate trajector. The landmark 
manifests four functional features central to the relation of CONTAINMENT 
(hiding, protecting, storing and being filled). In Fish swim in the water, the 
predicate profiles a 3DIM, non-porous, non-bounded landmark, an indeterminate 
trajector and two functional properties of the LM (hiding and protecting). 
Nevertheless, the two predicates share a force dynamic schema of CONSTRAINT 
(Cl). Thus, they are less polysemous than The brain is in the head and There is a 
curve in the road, which differ at the superordinate level. In other words, they are 
examples of the distinct senses of in. The former instantiates the CONTAINER 
schema (IN-1). The latter illustrates the PART-WHOLE schema (IN-2).46
4.3.3 The preposition in as a radial category
In Section 2.3.6, I adopted a usage-based model of categorisation for the 
semantic analysis of the preposition in. In other words, the 56 uses of the 
preposition will be defined in terms of both prototype(s) and schemas. Specific 
examples will be arranged in a radial category structure.
Radial categories have a centre-periphery organisation. They build around a 
central schema or prototype and include as members of the category those 
schemas that show resemblance or relatedness to the central case. In other words, 
a radial category is a typical prototype phenomenon.47 The major challenge in 
describing radial categories is two-fold:
a) to define the central (or prototypical member of the category),
45 A detailed survey o f cognitive approaches to polysemy is provided in Section 2.4.3 of the thesis.
46 The three senses o f in have been distinguished on the basis o f the results o f Experiment 2 
(Section 3.4.3.1)
47 Hawkins (1985) discusses correspondences between Rosch’s model o f natural categories and 
their treatment in Space Grammar. He concludes that Rosch’s model contributes to the structure 
within the inventory o f conventional units in the following ways:
- vertical relation is rendered by schematicity
- the superordinate unit is a schema
- members o f the taxonomy are elaborations o f the schema.
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b) to describe the ways in which the non-central members are related to the 
prototype by providing motivation for the inclusion of those non-central 
members as extensions from the prototype. On the one hand, motivation suggests 
a non-arbitrary link between central and non-central cases. On the other hand, 
extensions from the prototype cannot be predicted.
The relation between a schematic unit in the grammar and a particular 
elaboration of that schema in actual language use is called sanction. A 
conventionalised schema sanctions the use of its specific elaborations. For 
instance, in in The brain is in the head is fully sanctioned by the schema IN-1 
defined by a medium LM, an indeterminate TR configuration and a force dynamic 
schema C l. In other words, it instantiates the schema without any strain.
Extensions from a schema occur through partial sanction. A usage event that is 
only partially sanctioned by the schema is not fully compatible with the schema’s 
specifications. For example, 2DIM, bounded mediums are extended from 3DIM, 
bounded mediums with respect to dimensionality. Boers (1994) regards 
phenomena of that kind as a diachronic extension. In other words, there exist 
certain parameters of a schema which occur in our experience prior to extended 
values (Section 2.3.6.2).
I suggest that 3DIM, porous, bounded cylinder landmarks with the prominent 
functional attribute of hiding motivate 2 (or less) DIM, non-porous, non-bounded, 
channel landmarks with the prominent functional attribute of displaying (Section
4.3.6).
Partial sanction will also be recognised for figurative uses. In Have you ever 
been in love?, the relation is profiled against the abstract domain of emotions, the 
structure of which has been adopted from the experientially more basic spatial 
domain.
4.3.4 The image-schematic structure of the preposition in
In Section 3.2, I adopted a view that image schemata motivate connections 
between the senses of polysemous words.
The results of Experiment 1 presented in Section 3.4.2.1, suggest that the 
meaning of the 56 uses of the preposition in is, at least partially, structured by six 
preconceptual image schemas. Those are CONTAINER, PART-WHOLE, 
MERGING, PATH, FULL-EMPTY and FORCE.
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The results of Experiment 2 discussed in Section 3.4.3.1, indicate that the 
category structure of the preposition is organised around three related senses 
motivated by the schemas for CONTAINER, PART-WHOLE and PATH 
respectively. The results of Experiment 3, Section 3.4.4.1, point to the prominence 
of the CONTAINER schema in motivating the meaning of the preposition in. 
Therefore, I propose that the central uses of the preposition in are defined by the 
CONTAINER gestalt, whose parameters are presented below:48
1. the LM is a 3DIM, porous, bounded cylinder, which can carry and/or store the 
contained entity. The LM hides the TR from the view of the outside observer 
and/or protects it from external forces. The container profiles the FULL-EMPTY 
schema (Section 3.4.2.1);
2. the space TR is able to fill the container;
3. the relation is characterised by the CONSTRAINT (Cl) schema for FORCE 
(Section 4.2.3.2.1).
As suggested in Section 4.3.3, the three sense categories of in are family 
resemblances. Thus, the gestalt for the CONTAINER schema is realised to a 
different degree by the 56 uses of in.
Family resemblance chains are distinguished with respect to four geometric (1- 
4) and five functional (5-9) features of the LM (Section 4.2.3.1). The TR is 
considered with respect to geometry (10) and function (11). The FORCE schema 
for CONSTRAINT manifests degrees of prototypicality along the two continua, 
which are the prominence of the PATH and the salience of the trajector (12).
The twelve possible family resemblance chains are presented below:
1) dimensionality (room—>desert—>road—>head)49;
2) boundedness (head -»road—»water);
3) porosity (room—>grass—> water—»wall);
4) orientation (jar—»room);
the container’s functional ability to
5) carry (jar);
6) store (jar—>room);
7) hide (ore—»room—>window);
8) protect (jar—>arms—>stirrup);
48 The description of the CONTAINER gestalt is partly based on Johnson’s (1987) definition of 
the IN-OUT schema.
49 In There is a curve in the road, the LM is conceptualised as a 1DIM entity. In He was shot in the 
head, the LM is conceived as a ODIM point.
9) be filled (jar—>room—»rack);
10) the TR configuration can be space, indeterminate or reflexive;
11) the TR function is to fill the container;
12) the schema for CONSTRAINT is C l, C2 or C3.
I suggest that the IN-1 schema manifests the greatest number of the 
prototypical features characteristic of the meaning of in. Schemas IN-2 and IN-3 
will be considered less central members of the category (Sections 4.3.7-4.3.8).
4.3.5 The figurative senses of in
4.3.5.1 The domains
The theory of conceptual metaphor claims that extension of the linguistic 
object's reference can take place because the defining features of the basic referent 
set can be translated into different cognitive domains. The expressions used to talk 
about the target domain are linguistic reflexes of the ontological correspondences 
between the source and target domain, via which inferences are made about the 
target domain (Section 3.2.4). The notion of domains is elastic and domain 
boundaries tend to be fuzzy (Section 4.2.2).
In this study, the following domains will be referred to:
- the domain of oriented physical space (“down” and “up” being determined by 
the force of gravity);
- the domain of the human body;
- the domain of communication;
- the domain of time;
- the domain of age;
- the domain of perception;
- the domain of cognition;
- the domain of action;
- the domain of values;
- the emotive domains.
Those domains are structured schematically and thus interrelated in several 
ways (Section 2.3.6.3.2):
- the domain of the human body may be considered a subdomain of oriented 
physical space;
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- the domain of communication (linguistic action) may be considered a subdomain 
of action;
- time and space are interrelated basic domains that are part of virtually all events 
and activities;
- being a symptom of time, age may be considered a (specific) subdomain of time;
- cognition and perception are experientially interrelated domains;
- the domain of emotions comprises several subdomains: of states, conditions, 
characteristics, obligations.
Expressions activate domains. For example:
Ihepam t is in the ja r  activates the domain of oriented physical space. Dinner will 
be ready in ten minutes activates the domain of time.
“Literal” instances of spatial prepositions are those that primarily activate the 
domain of oriented physical space (or its subdomains). Primary activation of other 
domains is an indication of “figurativeness”(Boers 1994: 49). However, I suggest 
that “literalness” and “figurativeness” be conceived as gradual notions, a 
continuum from purely literal to highly figurative.50
Consider, for instance, Who is the woman in that painting? The expression 
activates the domains of space, perception and communication (Section 4.3.6.3.2). 
In other words, the example has both literal and metaphorical characteristics. If we 
conceive of “literalness” and “figurativeness” as a continuum, then the example 
would figure somewhere in the middle.
4.3.5.2 The metaphors
“Figurative” senses of prepositions arise when their schemas are mapped onto 
abstract domains (Section 3.2.2). The following set of metaphors motivates the 
figurative senses of the items under investigation here (Lakoff and Johnson 1980):
Orientational metaphors:
GOOD IS  UP which entails 
FULLY DEVELOPED IS UP 
BAD IS  DOWN which entails 
DETERIORATED IS  DOWN
BEING (PERCEPTUiLLY/COGNInVEL9  SALIENT IS  BEING A T  THE 
FRONT
Ontological/structural metaphors:
COGNITION IS PERCEPTION
THE CONDUIT METAPHOR ( Reddyl979):
IDEAS (MEANINGS) ARE OBJECTS 
LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS 
COMMUNICATION IS SENDING
The CONDUIT METAPHOR can be extended over communication in general 
(Brugmanl981). Its entailments thus are:
MEANS OF COMMUNICATION ARE CONTAINERS 
CONVEYING MESSAGES IS SENDING.
THE EVENT STRUCTURE METAPHOR (Lakoff 1993)
The metaphor defines various aspects of the event structure (states, changes, 
processes, actions, causes, purposes, and means) in terms of space, motion, and 
force.
The event structure metaphor is based on the dual metaphor for attributing 
properties or states to objects. In the location dual, the property or state is 
conceptualised as a location, and the object that has the property is schematised as 
existing in that location.51
The superordinate-level metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS has the 
following entailments:
STATES/ EMOTIONS/ CONDITIONS ARE CONTAINERS 
NEGATIVE STATES/EMOTIONS/CONDITIONS ARE CONSTRAINERS.
Emotions are located in the body. Consequently,
THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS and, according to the principle 
of transitivity,
PARTS OF THE BODY ARE CONTAINERS FOR EMOTIONS 
EMOTIONS ARE VOLUMES IN CONTAINERS.
As time is conceptualised in terms of space, the ontology of time is understood 
in terms of things and motion (Lakoff 1993). Time can be conceptualised as
50 Note that the matrix of an expression may contain domains o f diverse degrees o f complexity and 
abstarction (Section 4.2.2).
51 Lakoff (1993) introduces the term duality to explain the apparent inconsistencies in the mapping 
between experience and linguistic representation. He suggests that the conceptual metaphor theory 
provides a way to deconstruct the target domain to make it compatible with a multi-entity source 
domain and image schema.
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stationary or moving (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). If time is a fixed location, the 
observer is moving with respect to it. Lakoff (1993) points to the following 
entailments:
- time has extension and can be measured;
- an extended time, like a spatial area, may be conceived of as a bounded region. 
Thus:
TIME IS A PATH AND WE MOVE ON IT
PERIODS OF TIME ARE BOUNDED REGIONS OF SPACE
AGES ARE BOUNDED REGIONS OF SPACE.
I propose another entailment of the 
STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor, which is 
SUBJECTS (OF STUDY) ARE AREAS.
Other components of the event structure metaphor relevant to the current study 
are:
CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS INTO OR OUT OF BOUNDED REGIONS 
PROCESSES ARE MOVEMENTS (ALONG PATHS)
ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOVEMENTS (ALONG PATHS) 
PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, to which I suggest two entailments, namely 
RESULTS ARE DESTINATIONS and RESULTS ARE CONSTRAINERS 
MEANS ARE PATHS TO DESTINATIONS.
The orientational and structural metaphors listed above will be applied in the 
case study below (Sections 4.3.6-4.3.8).
According to the Invariance Hypothesis (Section 3.2.4), metaphorical 
mappings preserve the cognitive topology of the source domain in a way that is 
consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain. Moreover, the mapping 
onto target domains is restricted to salient features. In other words, the image- 
schematic profile of the target domain points to the most relevant features of the 
source domain. Thus, the analysis of the metaphorical uses of in will highlight the 
relevant parameters of the CONTAINER schema (Section 3.4.4.1.1).
4.3.6 The category IN-X
4.3.6.1 Introduction
The schematic structure of the category IN-1 is presented in Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1- The schematic structure of the category IN-1
Figure 1 above comprises twenty-two schemas.52 The specification of each schema 
is at the top of the frame. Metaphorical uses are defined by the number of the 
schema they are extended from and the letter A. The number of uses subsumed by 
the schema is displayed at the bottom of the frame.
The superordinate schema for the category is in the broken-line frame at the top 
of the diagram (Schema I). It subsumes the forty-two uses of in at the highest level 
of abstraction. The TR (indeterminate) and the LM (medium) constitute e-sites to 
be elaborated by the specific uses. The force dynamic schema is specified as C1 
(Section 4.2.3.2.1).
The full-headed arrows symbolise elaborations of the schema which conform to 
its specifications but characterise it with finer detail (Langacker 1988). The 
elaborations specify the features of the landmark (LM), the traj ector (TR) and the 
functional properties (F).
The partial-headed arrows symbolise meaning extensions or
“ imply some conflict in specification between basic and extended values.” 
(Langacker 1988: 134)
Thus, I assume that 3DIM, porous, bounded, cylinder landmarks and non­
reflexive, space trajectors are more experientially basic than their respective 
opposites. Moreover, the landmark which is able to hide the TR is more 
prototypical than that which displays it (Sections 4.3.3). Consequently, the features 
in bold-border frames (Schemas II-VII) represent the prototypical parameters of 
the CONTAINER schema (Section 4.3.4).53
The examples in the thick bold-border frame (Schema VII) represent the global 
prototype for the category in54 Instances in double-border frames stand for local 
prototypes (Langacker 1988). Metaphorical extensions are placed in dotted-border 
frames. Examples whose status on the continuum between literalness and 
figurativeness is uncertain are placed in dotted-border frames surrounded by 
single-border ones (Section 4.2.4.2).
First, I will analyse a set of sixteen examples defined by 3DIM, porous, 
bounded, cylinder landmarks. In each set of examples, the spatial instances will be
52 The schematic organisation is purely a reflection of my subj ective opinion. As Hawkins
(1985 .231) points out “the amount of structure within a categoiy differs from one person to the 
next”.
53 This definition of the prototypical parameters for the relation of CONTAINMENT is consistent 
with the findings of Developmental Psychology (Section 3.3.4).
54 The prototype will be discussed in Section 4.3.6.2.3.
discussed first (Section 1.2). The analysis of metaphorical extensions is presumed 
to offer a deeper insight into the semantics of the spatial senses.
4.3.6.2 Schema IV: 3DIM, porous, bounded, cylinder landmarks
4.3.6.2.1 Schema V: non-reflexive trajectors
There are fourteen uses of in defined by the prototypical LM hiding the non­
reflexive TR. The six metaphorical uses (Schemas VI A and VII A) will be 
extended from the spatial examples. The eight spatial uses subsumed under 
Schema V are:
1. Do you recognise that man in jeans?
2. He is in bed.
3. The magazine is in the rack.
4. There is a stone in my hand.
5. She has got a child in her arms.
6. There is something in my eye.
7. The brain is in the head.
8. The paint is in the jar.
In the eight examples above, the relation is profiled against the domain of 
oriented physical space, a part of which is the base of human body. In the first 
seven uses, the TR configuration is indeterminate. Example 8 profiles a space TR. 
In Examples 1-3 and 6, the landmarks are geometrically idealised to box-like 
openings closed by imaginary horizontal planes. In Examples 4 and 5, the 
geometric descriptions involve space-like interiors delimited by many imaginary 
planes. In Example 7, the opening of the container is imaginary. Example 8 is the 
global prototype of the category and will be discussed in Section 4.3.6.2.3.
In Example 1, the landmark (jeans) is moved by the metonymic trajector 
(hands) to contain the active zone of the TR (legs). Thus, I suggest, contrary to 
Herskovits (1986: 153), that the relationship between Figure and Ground is not
inverted in Example 1 as the movement is performed by the (metonymic)
trajector. Moreover, the landmark controls the position of the trajector (its active 
zone participating in the relation).
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43.6.2.2 Schema VI
The schema is elaborated by the following instances:
2. He is in bed.
3. The magazine is in the rack.
4. There is a stone in my hand.
5. She has got a child in her arms.
6. There is something in my eye.
7. The brain is in the head.
The six examples subsumed under Schema VI elaborate the LM with respect to 
the FULL-EMPTY schema (Section 3.4.2.1). In other words, the landmarks 
manifest the potential to be filled as in Your head is full o f stupid ideas, Her eyes 
were filled with tears, or My hands are full. The two landmarks bed and rack are 
less prototypical with respect to that functional characteristic.
The landmarks in Examples 6 and 7 illustrate the concept of the transitivity of 
the relation of CONTAINMENT (Section 3.3.4). The BODY AS A CONTAINER 
schema motivates the conceptualisation of parts of the body (eye, head) as 
containers.
4.3.6.2.2.1 Schema VI A: metaphorical extensions
There are three metaphorical uses which can be extended from Schema VI:
9. Your car is in very good condition.
10. Have you ever been in love?
11. We watched the scene in horror.
In Example 9, the topology of the source domain is mapped onto the abstract 
domain of conditions in consonance with the two conceptual metaphors 
CONDITIONS ARE CONTAINERS and GOOD IS UP (Section 4.3.5.2).
Examples 10 and 11 profile relations against the abstract domain of emotions. 
The mapping can be summarised by an entailment of the event structure metaphor 
- EMOTIONS ARE CONTAINERS. In Example 11, the container is oriented along 
the up-down axis (to fall in love, to be deeply in love). In Example 11, the abstract 
container makes salient the CONSTRAINT schema Cl. The negative emotion 
(horror) paralyses the movements and thus controls the position of the trajector 
(We were horror-stricken). Consequently, the mapping is summarised by the 
metaphor NEGATIVE EMOTIONS ARE CONSTRAINERS (Section 4.3.5.2).
101
To sum up, the three metaphorical extensions from Schema VI preserve the 
following topological features from the source domain:
- the up-down orientation of the landmark;
- the FULL-EMPTY schema;
- the CONSTRAINT schema Cl.
According to the Invariance Hypothesis, those are the salient features of the 
CONTAINER schema (Section 3.2.4).
4.3.6.2.3 Schema VII: the prototype
In Section 2.3.6.2, I defined the prototype as the most frequently used 
representative of the categorywhich displays the highest degree of family 
resemblance and is most likely to be activated in a neutral context. In other words, 
the prototype is a metonymic representation of the category (Section 2.3.6.3.1). 
Cuyckens proposes that
“[...] spatial relations of complete COINCIDENCE between x and a 3DIM, 
bounded, porous medium with relatively high vertical sides are most 
prototypical. Examples are: ‘the milk in the glass’, ‘the jewels in the box’.” 
(Cuyckens 1993: 63)
I propose that the prototype of in be defined as a predicate profiling a relation 
of CONTAINMENT between a 3DIM, porous, bounded cylinder medium and a 
space trajector. The relation is characterised by the force dynamic schema C l and 
manifests the five functional features discerned in Section 4.2.3.1.3. 
Consequently, I propose that Example 8 above be the prototype of the category 
IN-1. Assuming that the IN-1 schema is the most prototypical of the three senses 
of in distinguished here, I suggest that The paint is in the jar  constitutes the global 
prototype for the category subsuming the 56 uses of in.
4.3.6.2.3.1 Schema VII A: metaphorical extensions
There are three metaphorical extensions from the prototype:
12. He is deaf in one ear.
13. He refused to say anything in reply to the question.
14. He spoke in Russian.
In Example 12, the abstract trajector is a characteristic (deafness) which a 
person can develop. The idea of being developed involves a gradual change 
towards a full form (a person can be partially or completely deaf). Consequently,
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the relation in the abstract domain highlights the topology of the source domain 
with reference to the FULL-EMPTY schema and the space configuration of the 
trajector. In other words, characteristics are conceptualised as entities in a 
container (the person or his part) whose degree of intensity is mapped onto the up- 
down axis.
Those assumptions are in consonance with Kovecses’(1986) conclusions on 
the nature of emotions.55 The two conceptual metaphors: EMOTIONS 
(CHARACTERISTICS) ARE VOLUMES IN CONTAINERS and FULLY 
DEVELOPED IS UP summarise the mapping (Section 4.3.5.2).
Examples 13 and 14 instantiate the conduit metaphor (Reddy 1979). Words of 
the reply as well as the words of the Russian language are containers for ideas 
(meanings). In communication, the containers are sent along the conduit 
(trajectory) to the interlocutor. In Example 13, the container (reply) was “sent 
empty”, as the person said nothing in reply to the question. The part of the conduit 
metaphor defining communication as sending along an imaginary trajectory is 
responsible for the link between IN-1 and IN-3, which is motivated by the PATH 
image schema.
To sum up, the three metaphorical extensions from the prototype highlight the 
following topological features of the source domain:
- the landmark is oriented along the up-down axis;
- the trajector configuration is space;
- the FULL-EMPTY schema motivates the orientation of the landmark;
- the container carries the entities contained.
4.3.6.2.4 Schema VIII: reflexive trajectors
In Section 4.2.3.1.1, reflexive trajectors were defined as entities moving 
relative to their own prior boundaries. Two examples elaborate Schema IV with 
respect to the trajector configuration:
15. Slice the potatoes in two.
16. The house is in ruins.
In Section 4.3.5.2, I defined the distinction between literal and figurative 
meanings as a continuum. The two instances above can be located in its middle. 
The relations activate the domain of oriented physical space but are motivated by 
conceptual metaphors. In both examples, the initial configuration of the trajector
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is geometrically described as a volume. The activity of slicing (Example 15) and 
the process of deterioration (Example 16) diminish the original size of the 
trajector. The resulting configuration is thus indeterminate. Consequently, the 
respective processes are conceptualised as terminative paths along the up-down 
axis. Moreover, the initial state (configuration) of the trajector corresponds to its 
full form. The mapping is thus summarised by three conceptual metaphors: 
FULLY DEVELOPED IS UP, DETERIORATED IS DOWN, PROCESSES ARE 
MOVEMENTS ALONG PATHS (Section 4.3.5.2).
The terminative path along which the process is conceptualised corresponds to 
the PATH-FOCUS TO END-POINT FOCUS image-schematic transformation 
(Section 3.2.3) The PATH metaphor motivates the link between Schema VIII and 
the IN-3 category.
4.3.6.3 Schema IX: 3DIM, porous, bounded, channel landmarks
The schema subsumes seven uses of in. First, the landmarks manifesting the 
hiding function will be discussed.
4.3.6.3.1 Schema X: the hiding landmarks
The functional attribute of hiding is manifested by three landmarks:
17. They live in the middle of the wood.
18. There is a wardrobe in the comer.
19. He is in the bedroom.
In Examples 17 and 19, the landmarks are spaces delimited by imaginary 
planes (Section 4.2.3.1.3.2). The geometric idealisations emerge here as a 
consequence of the transitivity of the relation of CONTAINMENT (Section
3.3.4). The landmarks are objects included in the overall volume defined by the 
part of space (room) or environment (wood) (Herskovits 1986). In other words, 
the landmarks in Examples 17 and 18 display the geometric, functional, and 
topological properties of their respective wholes with the exception that their 
boundaries are vague and need to be mentally elaborated.
The landmark in Example 17 (the middle of the wood) differs from that in 
Example 18 as it is a part of a non-porous entity. Herskovits (1986) claims that the 
landmark of the relation of inclusion can be one of the many intrinsic regions into 
which the area is divided. Thus, it cannot be induced by terms of the kind, side, 
right, half. Middle, however, is an exception as
55 Kovecses (1986) claims that strong emotions are structured by the metaphor EMOTIONS ARE
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“[...] in the middle is used regardless of the properties of the object of which it is 
the middle.” (Herskovits 1986: 154)
I suggest that the CENTRE-PERIPHERY image schema motivates the 
combination in the middle. The closest synonyms to middle are central and inside. 
Thus, my assumption is that middle is conceptualised as the centre of the inside 
(of the container).
Example 19 (Schema XI) is the local prototype of Schema X (and IX) as it 
elaborates the landmark with respect to three functional properties protecting, 
storing and being filled.
4.3.6.3.2 Schema XII: displaying landmarks
The four examples subsumed under Schema XII are elaborations of Schema IX 
with respect to the functional properties of the landmark. However, they are 
extensions from Schema X as hiding is experientially prior to CONTAINMENT 
(Section 4.3.3). The examples are:
20. My foot is in the stirrup.
21. There are toys in the window.
22. He was standing in the doorway.
23. Who is the woman in that painting?
In Examples 20-22, the landmarks are geometrically construed as imaginary 
bounded spaces. In Examples 21-22, the geometric idealisation is motivated by 
the principle of the transitivity of CONTAINMENT. Windows and doors are 
“openings” partially bounded by the interior of the room. Being in the window or 
in the doorway thus implies being at the front of the container-interior. The front- 
back orientation is also imposed by our perception of the elements of the picture 
(Example 23). The 2DIM surface is viewed as having a foreground and a 
background.
The profiling in Examples 21-23 is motivated by the conceptual metaphor 
BEING SALIENT IS BEING AT THE FRONT. The metaphors MEANS OF 
COMMUNICATION ARE CONTAINERS and CONVEYING MESSAGES IS 
SENDING underlie the conceptualisation in Example 23. The painting is 
conceptualised as an artistic means for conveying the painter’s message. The
HEATED LIQUIDS IN A CONTAINER.
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prominence of the trajector is the link between Schemas XII, XII A and the
category IN-2 (Section 4.4).
4.3.6.4 Schema XIII: non-porous landmarks
The schema subsumes fifteen examples, which renders it almost as productive 
(prototypical) as Schema IV (Section 4.3.6.2). However, Hawkins suggests that
“[...] because the human being [...] functions and (sometimes) flourishes in a 
very porous medium (i.e., air), and because a large majority of physical objects 
with which the human being comes into contact also function in the same porous 
MEDIUM, [...] MEDIUM configurations with a very porous internal 
consistency have a certain primacy over (i.e., are more prototypical than) those 
with a more solid internal consistency.” (Hawkins 1985: 312)
Therefore, primacy has been given to porous mediums (Section 4.3.6.2.3). The 
schema subsumes bounded and non-bounded landmarks. The former will be 
discussed first.
4.3.6.4.1 Schema XIV: bounded landmarks
The schema subsumes fourteen examples, eleven of which are spatial:
24. The snake is in the grass.
25. The squirrel is in the tree.
2 6 .1 got stuck in a traffic jam.
27. Jersey is in the English Channel.
28. The kettle hangs in the fire.
29. He has got a ring in his ear.
30. The socket is in the wall.
31. The nails are in the board.
32. There is a hole in the road.
33. She takes milk in her coffee.
34. The gold is in the ore.
Examples 24-26 feature mediums geometrically defined as groups of solid 
objects (Section 4.2.3.1.3.2).56 Thus, with reference to internal consistency, they 
are non- prototypical non-porous mediums. However, the MULTIPLEX TO
56 Herskovits (1986) argues in favour of conceptualising the medium in Example 25 as an outline. I 
propose that the landmark be viewed as a collection of branches, thus motivating its geometric 
idealisation to a group of solid objects. My interpretation seems to have been confirmed by the 
results of Experiment 3, where the example was partially understood in terms of the MERGING 
schema (Section 3.4.4.1).
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MASS image-schematic transformation justifies their membership in the category 
Schema XIV (Section 3.2.3).57 Examples 27-32 profile a relation between an 
indeterminate trajector “embedded” in a medium landmark, which is 
geometrically defined as a volume (Examples 27-31) or a lamina (Example 32).58 
Although the relation is characterised by partial inclusion, the CONSTRAINT 
schema Cl is manifested (Section 4.2.3.2.1). The degree of prototypicality of the 
force dynamic schema is higher for dense mediums (ear, wall, board). Example 33 
profiles a relation in which the particles of the trajector (milk) are understood to 
“merge” with the particles of the landmark (coffee) (Cuyckens 1993). Example 34 
(Schema XV) is the local prototype for Schema XIII. It elaborates the landmark 
with respect to two functional attributes, hiding and protecting.
4.3.6.4.2 Schemas XIV A, XV A: metaphorical extensions
There are three metaphorical extensions from Schemas XIV and XV:
35. She is in the news.
36. Mary is in her twenties.
37. There is a pain in my back.
Examples 35-36 are extended from Schema XIV. The landmarks are 
conceptualised according to the MULTIPLEX TO MASS image-schematic 
transformation projected onto the domain of communication (Example 35) or time 
(Example 36).
Example 35 is motivated by the conceptual metaphors MEANS OF 
COMMUNICATION ARE CONTAINERS and CONVEYING MESSAGES IS 
SENDING, which emerged as an entailment of the conduit metaphor in Section 
4.3.5.2. The news is conceptualised as a message broadcast (sent) through the air 
(conduit) to viewers. Example 36 is motivated by the metaphor AGES ARE 
BOUNDED REGIONS OF SPACE.
Example 37 is extended from the local prototype (Schema XV). The abstract 
trajector (pain) is located in the non-porous, bounded, hiding medium. The 
example is motivated by the metaphors PARTS OF THE BODY ARE 
CONTAINERS FOR EMOTIONS and NEGATIVE EMOTIONS ARE
57 In the case o f example 26, the schematic transformation is justified by the very definition o f the 
landmark. Jam  is a crowded mass.
58 According to Herskovits (1986:42) the hole would be in the “normal” volume o f the road - that 
is, within the part o f space that the road would occupy if  it had no hole.
CONSTRAINERS. In Section 3.4.4.1, the experimental results indicated that pain 
was perceived as a constrainer acting upon the trajector.
To sum up, the metaphorical mapping in Examples 35-37 highlights the 
following prototypical attributes of the CONTAINER schema:
- the functional potential of the landmark to carry (Example 35);
- its ability to hide (Example 37).
4.3.6.4.3 Schema XVI: non-bounded landmarks
Example 38 below elaborates the schema:
38. Fish swim in the water.
The active zone of the landmark (medium) is a 3DIM, non-porous, non­
bounded volume which hides and protects the indeterminate trajector.
4.3.6.5 Schema XVII: 2DIM, bounded landmarks.
Four examples are subsumed under the schema:
39. The circle is drawn in a triangle.
40. We are in Scotland.
41. The camel is in the desert.
42. He lives in our neighbourhood.
The predicates in the above examples profile relations against a part of the 
domain of physical space which is geometrically defined as an area. However, 
there are constraints on what can be conceptualised as an area.
“ It is not sufficient that an object be geometrically two-dimensional; it must also 
be part of the surface divided into cells, so one can contrast inclusion in one cell 
with inclusion in another. [...] Geographical regions are sections of a divided 
surface, namely the ground.”
(Herskovits 1986: 46)
The landmarks in Examples 40-42 illustrate the transitivity of 
CONTAINMENT (Section 3.3.4). The inclusion of Schema XVII is motivated by 
the boundedness of mediums (Cuyckens 1993). Thus, the more delineated the 
medium, the more prototypical the relation. Consequently, Examples 41 and 42 
are closest to the definition of the CONTAINER schema (Section 4.3.4).59
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4.3.6.6 Conclusions
Boers (1994: 46) states that the relative frequencies of occurrence of the 
distinct schemas in the primary domain will be taken as a first indication of their 
status in the radial category.
The schema IN-1 subsumes 42 of the 56 items under investigation. Thus, it is 
regarded as the central schema of the preposition in (Section 4.3.4). Consequently, 
the uses subsumed under the schema display the highest number of family 
resemblance features (Cuyckens 1993). The global prototype manifests all the 
twelve parameters of the CONTAINER schema (Section 4.3.6.2.3). As the 
schema’s “motivating power” with respect to figurative extensions is another 
major criterion to decide on its status within the category, the fourteen figurative 
uses confirm the centrality of the IN-1 schema (Boers 1994). The abstract senses 
highlight the most salient parameters of the CONTAINER gestalt (Section
4.2.4.2).
The present conclusions are compatible with the experimental results from 
Section 3.4. Twenty-eight out of the forty-two uses of in subsumed under IN-1 
were classified as members of the CONTAINER category. Moreover, ten out of 
the sixteen most prototypical examples subsumed under Schema V were identified 
as such in Experiment 3 (Section 3.4.4.1.1). Furthermore, the CONTAINER 
schema was provided as “a second best choice” in eleven of the twenty seven 
examples subsumed under the schemas for PART-WHOLE, MERGING, FORCE 
and PATH.
To sum up, the semantic analysis of the IN-1 category points to the centrality 
of that schema within the radial category in.
59 The conceptualisation o f countries as containers is reinforced by the following phrases up and  
down the country and high country.
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4.3.7 The category IN-2
4.3.7.1 Introduction
The schematic structure of the category IN-2 is presented in Figure 2 below.
XVIII 
TR: indet. 
LM: medium 
FD: C2
XX
LM: 2DIM 
F: display
XDC A
XXI
LM: I DIM  
F: display
XIX
LM: 3DIM  
bounded, 
non-porous 
F: display
Figure 2. The schematic structure of the category IN-2
The category IN-2 subsumes six uses of in under five schemas. The 
superordinate schema (XVIH) specifies the e-sites for the medium LM and the 
indeterminate trajector. The relation is defined by the C2 force dynamic schema 
for CONSTRAINT (Section 4.2.3.2.1). Consequently, the six trajectors are 
displayed by their respective landmarks.
Schema XIX is the local prototype which shares the features of three- 
dimensionality and boundedness with the category IN-1.
Schema XXI is the peripheral member of the category in as if fully instantiates 
the specifications of the superordinate schema. In other words, examples in 
Schema XXI are motivated by the PART-WHOLE image-schema and show 
featural overlap with the preposition of (Section 4.4). Schema XIX A subsumes 
“less literal” senses of the preposition in (Section 4.3.5.2).
Partial-headed arrows indicate diachronic extensions with respect to the 
landmark’s dimensionality as well as “more figurative” uses.
4.3.7.2 Schema XIX: the local prototype
There are three examples which profile predicates with 3DIM, non-porous, 
bounded landmarks:
4 3 .1 have been waiting in this queue for ages.
44. One in ten people had problems with reading.
45. The monument is in granite.
In the three examples above, the trajectors are indeterminate and figure 
prominently against their respective landmarks. In Example 43, the medium is 
geometrically elaborated by a group of solid objects, a part of which is the 
trajector (Section 4.2.3.1.3.2).
4.3.7.2.1 Schema XIX A: metaphorical extensions
Examples 44 and 45 above are the two metaphorical extensions from Schema 
XIX. The two examples are “more figurative” than Example 43 as they activate 
the domain of oriented physical space but are structured by conceptual metaphors.
In the case of Example 44, the conceptualisation is motivated by the metaphors 
BEING SALIENT IS BEING AT THE FRONT and COGNITION IS PERCEPTION 
(Section 4.3.5.2). The trajector is perceptually (and cognitively) foregrounded 
with respect to the landmark.
In the case of Example 45, the mapping is summarised by four conceptual 
metaphors: BEING SALIENT IS BEING AT THE FRONT, MEANS OF 
COMMUNICATION ARE CONTAINERS, CONVEYING MESSAGES IS 
SENDING, PROCESSES ARE MOVEMENTS ALONG PATHS. The process of 
creating a monument is conceptualised as movement along a terminative path (or 
a PATH-FOCUS TO END-POINT FOCUS image-schematic transformation). The 
sculptor is hammering the monument (foreground) out of granite (background), 
thus making it perceptually salient. Granite is a means through which he expresses 
his artistic message.
To sum up, the mapping highlights the following aspects of the source domain:
- the salience of the trajector against the landmark 
(Examples 44 and 45);
- the prominence of the PATH schema resulting from the carrying function of the 
landmark (Example 45).
The resulting topology is unprototypical for the preposition in (Section 4.3.4).
4.3.7.3 Schema XX: the 2DIM landmark
The schema subsumes one spatial use of in:
46. There is a gold thread in the carpet.
I l l
The predicate profiles a relation against the domain of oriented physical space
between a 2DIM, bounded lamina medium and a point-like trajector.
4.3.7.4 Schema XXI: 1DIM landmarks
The schema subsumes two instances, whose trajectors can be described as 
“geometric accidents” (Herskovits 1986: 52):
47. The dip in the graph is very significant.
48. There is a curve in the road.
The predicates are the central instantiations of the CONSTRAINT schema C2. 
The movement of the trajectors preceding the relations is undetectable and their 
prominence in the respective profiles very high (Section 4.2.3.2.1).
4.3.7.5 Conclusions
The category IN-2 is related to the central schema IN-1 via Schema XLX. It is 
thus a peripheral member of the in category as well as a poor instantiation of the 
o f schema. Schema XXI elaborates the parameters of the PART-WHOLE schema 
to a greater degree, manifesting a more significant overlap with the category of 
(Section 3.4.2.1).
The present conclusions can be related to the experimental results discussed in 
Section 3.4.4.
Four of the six examples subsumed under IN-2 were classified as instances of the 
PART-WHOLE schema. Those that constitute the local prototype (Schema XIX) 
were given higher ratings {One in ten people had problems with reading 10, I  
have been waiting in this queue for ages 8) than the marginal members of the in 
category (Schema XXI). The remaining eight examples subsumed under the 
PART-WHOLE schema in Section 3.4.4.1.2 showed an image-schematic overlap 
with the CONTAINER schema (six instances) and the PATH schema (two 
examples).
4.3.8 The category IN-3
4.3.8.I. Introduction
The schematic structure of the category IN-3 is presented in Figure 3 below.
XXIII
LM: porous, 
bounded, 
channel 
F: hide, 
protect, 
be filled, 
store/carry 
2
lXXII
TR: terminative path 
LM: medium 
FD: C3
* XXIV A
5 LM: 1DIM
Figure 3. The schematic structure of the category IN-3
The category IN-3 consists of four schemas which subsume eight uses of in. 
The superordinate Schema XXII defines the category as a relation between a 
medium landmark and a terminative path trajector. The force dynamic schema is 
that of C3 (Section 4.2.3.2.1). The category is motivated by the CONTAINER 
gestalt as well as the PATH image-schema. The prominence of the PATH schema 
causes all predicates, to a lesser or greater extent, to be structured metaphorically 
(Section 4.3.5.2).
The prototype of the category (Schema XXm) is connected to the schema IN-1 
via the features of the landmark: three-dimensionality, porosity, boundedness, 
hiding, being filled and carrying or storing. It is related to the PATH schema via 
the configuration of the trajector.
Schema XXIV is the peripheral member of the category in, whose four 
metaphorical extensions are subsumed by Schema XXIV A. It is extended from 
Schema XXIII with respect to the properties of the landmark.
4.3.8.2 Schema XXIII: the local prototype
Schema XXIII subsumes two uses of in:
49. Get in the car.
50. Put the butter in the fridge.
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The predicates profile a relation of COINCIDENCE between an indeterminate 
trajector and a medium landmark. The PATH figures prominently in the base 
motivating the structuring of the relations by means of the conceptual metaphor 
ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOVEMENTS ALONG PATHS (Section
4.3.5.2).
4.3.8.3 Schema XXIV: ODIM landmarks
The schema subsumes two elaborations profiled against the domain of oriented 
physical space:
51. The sun is in my face.
52. He was shot in the head.
The mediums are conceptualised as points which coincide with the end-points 
of the PATH trajectors. In Example 51, the trajector (sun) is represented 
metonymically by its rays, which are conceptualised as paths. In Example 52, the 
mapping is summarised by the metaphor ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED 
MOVEMENTS ALONG PATHS.
4.3.8.3.I Schema XXIV A: metaphorical extensions
There are four metaphorical extensions from Schema XXIV:
53. In refusing to go abroad, he missed his chance.
54. He is doing a degree in philosophy.
55. Dinner will be ready in ten minutes.
56. We are leaving in April.
In Example 53, the predicate activates the domain of communication (Section 
4.3.5.1). The action of refusing is structured by the metaphor ACTIONS ARE 
SELF-PROPELLED MOVEMENTS ALONG PATHS. The PATH is 
conceptualised as a conduit according to the metaphor CONVEYING MESSAGES 
IS SENDING. The PATH-FOCUS TO END-POINT FOCUS image-schematic 
transformation motivates the conceptualisation of the result of the action as a 
destination. The result of the utterance prevents the subjects (he) from performing 
the action of going abroad. Thus, the result of his linguistic action acts as a 
constrainer upon the activity of the subject. The metaphors RESULTS ARE 
DESTINATIONS and RESULTS ARE CONSTRAINERS summarise the mapping 
(Section 4.3.5.2).
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In Example 54, the activity of doing a degree is conceptualised as following a 
course of study in the area of philosophy, the result of which is obtaining a degree. 
Thus, the predicate is structured by the metaphors: ACTIONS ARE SELF- 
PROPELLED MOVEMENTS ALONG PATHS, PURPOSES ARE 
DESTINATIONS, MEANS ARE PATHS TO DESTINATIONS and SUBJECTS (OF 
STUDY) ARE AREAS.
Examples 55 and 56 are deictic predicates which activate the domain of time 
and involve the first type of subjectification (Section 2.2.5). The conceptualisation 
entails the potential terminative path proceeding from the observer to the trajector 
along the stationary time according to the metaphor TIME IS A PATH AND WE 
MOVE ALONG IT  (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).
In Example 55, both the configurations in the relational profile are 
indeterminate. The process of preparing the meal is conceptualised as proceeding 
along a path in the area of time. The end of the process coincides with the point on 
the temporal path. The mapping is summarised by the metaphors PERIODS OF 
TIME ARE BOUNDED REGIONS OF SPACE, PROCESSES ARE MOVEMENTS 
ALONG PATHS and the PATH-FOCUS TO END-POINT FOCUS image- 
schematic transformation.
In Example 56, the landmark is conceptualised as a bounded region resulting 
from the intrinsic division of the area (Section 4.2.3.1.3.2). In other words, 
months are understood as intrinsic parts of the year. The mapping is summarised 
by the metaphor PERIODS OF TIME ARE BOUNDED REGIONS OF SPACE and 
the PATH-FOCUS TO END-POINT FOCUS image-schematic transformation.
To sum up, the topology of the target domain highlights the following aspects 
of the source domain:
- the boundedness of the landmark;
- the carrying function of the landmark (Example 53);
- the salience of the PATH in the base.
The topology of the target domain suggests that the category IN-3 is less 
prototypical than IN-1.
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4.3.8.4 Conclusions
Cuyckens claims that
”[...] the set of path-uses of in as a whole is transformationally linked to its non­
path uses through metonymy. As Taylor (1989: 127) points out, there is a natural, 
metonymic relationship between the path followed by a moving entity and one of 
the infinite number of points located on the path.” ( Cuyckens 1993: 64)
In other words, there is an experiential motivation for the link between the 
categories IN-1 and IN-3. The connection between them is summarised by the fact 
that the final configuration of C3 is identical to that of Cl (Section 4.2.3.2.1). 
Thus, Schema XXDI in Figure 3 above subsumes the peripheral uses of in, which 
are the central uses of into. Schema XXIV includes examples which are peripheral 
for both prepositions and show some featural overlap with the preposition to.
The experimental results in Section 3.4.4 confirm the connection between the 
schemas. Four of the eight examples subsumed under the schema IN-3 were 
classified as members of the PATH schema in Section 3.4.4.1.5. Two of the other 
uses placed in the PATH category were co-motivated by the CONTAINER 
schema (He spoke in Russian, Mary is in her twenties), one (The dip in the graph 
is very significant) by the PART-WHOLE schema.
4.3.9 Summary
In Section 4.3, the category structure of the prepositional predicate in has been 
presented. Three senses of the preposition, motivated by the image-schematic 
profiles for CONTAINER, PART-WHOLE and FULL-EMPTY, have been 
distinguished (Section 3.4). Each sense has been presented as a category of 
schemas distributed at different levels of abstraction (Section 2.2.6). Central and 
peripheral members have been distinguished for each set.
4.4 The concluding remarks
4.4.1 Introduction
In Section 4.4.2, previous definitions of the preposition in will be presented. In 
Section 4.4.3,1 will offer my definition of the prepositional predicate.
4.4.2 Previous definitions of the spatial preposition in
4.4.2.1 Non-cognitive approaches
According to the core sense approach, the meaning of a polysemous lexical 
item was sufficiently defined by its most abstract features (Section 2.4.3.1). In the 
case of the preposition in, the traditional definitions concentrated on the 
dimensionality of the relatum.
Bennett (1975) and Cooper (1968) define in as a relation between x and the 
interior of y. Clark (1973) and Quirk and Greenbaum (1973) claim that in 
lexicalizes a COINCIDENCE relation between x and y. Clark defines y as a 
3DIM entity; Quirk and Greenbaum as a 3DIM volume or a 2DIM area.
According to Leech,
“ In expresses the concept of enclosure or containment as applied either to two- 
dimensional or three-dimensional locations.” (Leech 1969: 162)
Miller and Johnson-Laird propose the following definition:
“ IN (x, y): A referent x is in a relatum y if [...] [PART 
(X, Z) & INCLUDE (Z,Y)].” (Miller 1976: 385)
4.4.2.2 Cognitive approaches
In Cognitive Linguistics, the preposition in has been defined in a gestalt-like 
manner. The properties of the arguments and the characteristics of the relation 
have been considered.
Cuyckens defines in as
“[...] a relation of COINCIDENCE between x and the spatial configuration 
medium.” (Cuyckens 1993: 41)
Herskovits (1986: 46) defines the ideal meaning of in by means of a relation of 
inclusion and geometric conceptualisations of the arguments (Section 2.4.3.2.4).
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Vandeloise (1991: 225) describes the preposition as a functional relation 
container/contained (Section 2.4.3.2.5).
It is worth noting that all the definitions of in presented above account only for 
the spatial uses of the preposition.
4.4.3 The definition of the preposition in - a proposal
The results of the three experiments summarised in Section 3.5 as well as the 
conclusions emerging from the case study in Section 4.3 suggest that the 
preposition in be defined as a radial category of 31 schemas subsuming the 56 
uses of the prepositional predicate. The 31 schemas comprise the three senses of 
the preposition (IN-1, IN-2 and IN-3). The senses are partially motivated by the 
image schemas for CONTAINER, PART-WHOLE and PATH. They are 
interrelated via different sets of family resemblance features. The IN-1 schema is 
taken as the prototypical sense of in. Thus, it metonymically represents the 
meaning of the prepositional predicate in (Section 2.3.6.3.1). The global prototype 
is subsumed by Schema VII (Section 4.3.6.2.3). In other words, the meaning of 
the preposition in can be represented as a semantic category comprising Figures 1, 
2 and 3 above. As each of the diagrams has already been extensively discussed, 
some important links between them will now be presented in order to highlight 
the unity of the concept in.
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4.4.3.1 Links among superordinate schemas
The relations among the three senses of the preposition in at the highest level 
of abstraction are presented in Figure 4 below.
r;Schema I 
(IN-1)
TR: indeterminate 
LM: medium 
FD: C l
“ l
i--------- --------1
Schema XVIII 
(IN-2)
["Schema XXII ""[
TR:
*j(IN-3) 
j TR: terminative
pathindeterminate 
LM: medium 
FD: C2
LM: medium  
FD: C3
Figure 4. Links among the three superordinate schemas of the preposition in
In Figure 4 above, Schemas XVHI and XIII are extended from Schema I. The 
differences are summarised by the parameters of the respective realisations of the 
CONSTRAINT schema (Section 4.2.3.2.1).
Schema XVIII differs from Schema I with respect to the prominence of the 
PATH in the relation; Schema XIII departs from Schema I along two parameters, 
namely the prominence of the potential movement of the trajector preceding the 
relation and the degree to which the trajector is displayed by/against the landmark. 
Schemas XVIH and XHI are related to each other via similarity links symbolised 
by an arrow headed at both ends (Brugman 1981).
To sum up, the superordinate schemas for the three senses define prepositional 
polysemy at the highest level of abstraction (Section 4.3.2). The three schemas are 
likely to be subsumed by an even higher-order superschema (Lindner 1982).
4.3.2.2 Links among prototypical schemas
Figure 5 below represents links among four local and one global prototype of 
the category in.
Schema XXIII
Schema XIX
Schema XVI
Schema
VII
Schema XI
Figure 5. Links among the five prototypical schemas of the preposition in
In Figure 5 above, the links among the four local prototypes are those of 
similarity. They are extended from the global prototype (Schema VH). The 
differences are marked along three continua:
- the geometrical properties of the landmark
- and the trajector (Section 4.2.3.1.3.2);
- the functional features of the landmark (Section 4.2.3.1.3).
The five prototypical schemas define the category in at the basic level of 
abstraction.
4.4.3.3 Links among peripheral schemas
The two peripheral schemas of the category IN-1 (XII and XVII) are related to 
the category IN-2 via the functional feature of displaying. The third peripheral 
Schema VIII forms a transformational link to the category IN-3 via the PATH 
image schema. The peripheral Schema XXI shows an image-schematic overlap 
with that of the preposition to (Section 4.3.8.4). The non-central Schema XXIV 
shares an image-schematic profile with the preposition o f (Section 4.3.7.5).
4.4.4 Summary
To sum up, I propose a definition of the preposition in which relies for its 
meaning on the image-schematic profiles of individual predicates (Section 3.4). 
The conceptual structure manifests various levels of abstraction, with prototypes 
as metonymic members of categories. Individual uses are combined along 
different dimensions to form a family resemblance structure (Section 2.2.6). 
Peripheral members feature the fewest number of prototypical features (Section
4.3.4) and share some characteristics with other prepositions (into, to, of).
In comparison with the previous definitions of in, the category structure I 
suggest can account for spatial as well as abstract uses of the preposition. 
Moreover, it points to the different relations that the CONTAINER schema 
involves, among them containment, inclusion, differentiation, separation and 
choosing (Section 3.3.4).
Boundedness is the most superordinate of the concepts that in encompasses. At 
the same time, it is one the most relevant for human existence:
“ Man exists in this world and, in all primary experiences, the world is 
characterised by human existence. [...] Man’s direct experience is at first 
restricted to his ‘situation’ in space and time. The word ‘horizon’ offers itself as 
conveying this limitation.”(Verhaar 1963: 26)
The very nature of those concepts presupposes that the category in is structured 
as a continuum, contrasting hiding and displaying on the one hand, lack of motion 
and movement on the other. As a closed-class member, in highlights those 
relations by means of image-schematic overlaps. The basic patterns thus obtained 
can be applied to the analysis of verbs and other open-class members (Talmy 
1988).
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